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. Introduction
It is widely known that no feuds are as bitter as those between family
members or close friends. The conflict can be particularly destructive when
the dispute involves money and power. In the business context, friends or
family members who enter into business together may begin on good terms,
but their confidence in each other and in the bright prospects for the business
may blind them to the risks of future dissension.' Although their relationship
as fellow investors may be cooperative initially, it can often turn acrimonious
and result in serious corporate deadlock.2 In the most severe cases, irreconcil-
1. See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 199 (1988) (noting that shareholders "often fail to
anticipate the failure of their enterprise, or they demonstrate an overly optimistic trust in those
with whom they are undertaking the venture"). Business partners who have been friends for
years may never consider the possibility that serious hostility could arise between them at some
point in the future. See, e.g., Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 734 A.2d 721, 722 (N.J.
1999) (describing acrimonious relationship that developed between two former friends and
close business associates who operated successful business together for twenty-five years).
2. Deadlock has been defined as "a decision or indecision of stockholders, which results
in the corporation's inability to perform its corporate powers ... [or] a state of inaction or
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions." Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp.
1317, 1323 (D.S.C. 1987) (quoting Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405,408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978));
see also C. Clifford Allen, Annotation, Dissolution of Corporation on Ground ofIntracorporate
Deadlock or Dissension, 83 A.L.R. 3d 458, 462 n.3 (1978) (noting that deadlock "exists when
two or more factions, engaged in irreconcilable differences, have enough power in corporate
affairs which they may exercise, in enforcement of their respective views, in a way that hampers
corporate operations"). Statutory provisions that authorize involuntary dissolution of corpora-
tions typically define shareholder deadlock as the "fail[ure] at two consecutive annual meetings
at which all voting power was exercised, to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired." E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800 (West 1990).
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able differences may require that the business be dissolved even though the
parties have operated it successfully for many years.3
Shareholder conflicts that result in deadlock pose some of the most
difficult challenges for corporations and for corporate law.4 Although courts
have the authority to dissolve corporations that parties can no longer operate
effectively due to deadlock,' other less extreme measures are available. Many
states have statutes that specifically authorize courts to order any one of
several alternative remedies in cases of shareholder or director deadlock,6
3. In In re Hedberg-Freidheim & Co., 47 N.W. 2d 424 (Minn. 1951), two couples who
were friends each owned one-half of the business. Id. at 425. The corporation prospered
financially for several years before severe dissension arose between the two sides. Id. at 426.
The bitterness between the two factions was so deep that whenever one side offered a suggestion
for the benefit of the company, the other would "vote against it wholly in disregard of the
interests of the corporation" and without regard to the merits of the suggestion itself. Id. at 427.
Because it was safe to say "a stalemate [had] been reached," the court ruled that the corporation
could be dissolved due to the irreconcilable differences between the two equally divided
factions. Id. at 427-28.
4. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that relationships among corporate principals
can break down for any number of reasons, including personality differences, divergent
opinions regarding the future direction of the company, or possible self-dealing by one of the
participants. Courts and commentators often observe that the deterioration of relationships
among corporate participants may simply be the inevitable result of human nature. See, e.g.,
In re Application of Evening Journal Ass'n, 71 A.2d 158, 167 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950)
("Where the stock of a corporation is divided into two equal parts, human nature being what it
is, it is necessary and advisable for the parties to anticipate the possibility of a deadlock."), affid,
74 A.2d 303 (N.J. 1950); J. Leon Lebowitz, Corporations, 1972 Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw.
L.J. 86, 154 (1972) ("[G]iven the frailties of human nature, such [shareholder] relationships can
be easily soured for a variety of reasons ranging from petty annoyances to incompatibility to
outright knavery.").
5. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (IIl. 1960)
(allowing dissolution when two shareholder factions had been deadlocked for ten years and
evidence of oppressive conduct by one faction existed); In re Collins-Doan Co., 70 A.2d 159,
166 (N.J. 1949) (affirming order of dissolution in situation in which irreconcilable differences
between equally divided shareholders and directors existed). Many states have statutes for
involuntarily dissolving deadlocked corporations. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1430
(West 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800 (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104(a)(1)
(McKinney Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.14.300 (West Supp. 2002). However,
even in the absence of a statute, courts have retained the equity power to order the dissolution
of corporations. See Carlos L. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CM. L. REV. 778, 787-88 (1952) (stating that several courts
have used general equity powers to dissolve corporations).
6. See 16A WuiLAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8043 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995) (finding that states provide alterna-
tive remedies because dissolution is viewed as extreme remedy); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.1434 (West 2002) (providing alternative remedies); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.55,
5/12.56 (West Supp. 2002) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 2002) (same).
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including the following: the purchase of the shares of one shareholder by
another, the removal of officers or directors, or an accounting with respect to
any matter in dispute.7 The purpose of many of these alternate forms of relief
is to preserve the ongoing operations of the business.
One particular remedy that courts may grant in lieu of dissolution is the
appointment of a provisional director. The provisional director is a neutral
third party appointed by the court to the board of directors to act as a tie-
breaking director." Provisional directors possess the same rights and powers
of ordinary directors to vote at meetings. The role of the provisional director
is to vote to break deadlocks in the corporation.9 Part of the value of provi-
sional directors lies in their ability to mediate between hostile factions and to
encourage both sides to consider new ideas and alternatives for resolving
disputes amicably.'0 As a result, the provisional director remedy is a "unique
dispute-settling arrangement with characteristics akin to those of compulsory
arbitration, mediation, and conciliation."" To date over twenty states have
adopted statutes that specifically empower courts to appoint provisional
directors in cases of corporate deadlock,' 2 and courts in all states have the
7. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMe. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West Supp. 2002) (listing eleven
remedies in addition to dissolution that courts may order in action involving shareholder or
director deadlock); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(1) (2001) (listing nine additional remedies);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(a) (Michie 2001) (same).
8. See In re Annrhon, Inc., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (describing
provisional director as tie-breaker); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 18.4.3, at 797 (1986)
(discussing role of provisional director).
9. 16A FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 8043.
10. See Stuart L. Pachman, Provisional Directors, Custodians and Similar Referees, N.J.
LAW. MAO., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 13, 14 (explaining provisional director's role).
11. 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§ 9.33 (3d ed. 2000); see also Ernest L. Folk, M, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966
DUKE L.J. 875, 953 (describing provisional director as type of arbitrator or mediator).
12. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.640 (Michie 2000); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 308 (West Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (1991); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 29-101.167 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-941
(1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415B-67 (Michie 1997) (providing for provisional director
remedy in nonprofit corporations); 805 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(b)(7) (West Supp.
2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213 (1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 13-C, § 1434 (2)(E) (West
2002) (providing for appointment of "additional director"); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.323,
351.855 (West Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(1Xg) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
78A.150 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp. 2002); Oil-o REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.911 (West 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334 (West 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
18-410(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1990); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.53 (Vernon Supp. 2001);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2)(a)(7) (West 2002); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(a)(vii)
(Michie 2001). Michigan allows the corporation's shareholders or directors to designate one
or more directors as an "independent director." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1505(3) (West
THE PROVISIONAL DIRECTOR REMEDY
equitable power to order the designation of an additional director in lieu of
dissolution.'3
The provisional director approach to resolving corporate deadlock raises
difficult questions about both the autonomy rights of shareholders and the
ability of a court appointee to interfere with private business. One may argue
that "as a matter of principle no state or public interest justifies taking away the
right to veto corporate decisions from either of the deadlocked factions."'4
However, at the same time, judicial intervention to alleviate the paralytic
effects of deadlock may arguably be necessary to uphold the foundations of
private ordering.'
5
Perhaps the underlying complexity of the provisional director remedy
explains the widely divergent treatment of the remedy in different jurisdic-
tions. The discord among various states, courts, and authorities concerning the
appointment of provisional directors is striking. For example, the Model
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation
Act (MBCA-CC) provides for the appointment of provisional directors as one
remedy of many for corporate deadlock.'6 California allows courts to appoint
provisional directors in both public and private corporations." Delaware
affords the provisional director remedy only to the limited number of corpora-
tions that affirmatively elect close corporation status.' In Ohio, a court may
Supp. 2002).
13. See, e.g., In re Application of Hickory House, Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357-58 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1958) (finding that order to dissolve corporation would be improper but that "an order
may be submitted forthwith on consent providing for designation of a third director"). The
provisional director remedy appeared in an earlier proposed version of the New York Corpora-
tions Code. However, much to the chagrin of corporate law scholars who recognized the value
of the provisional director remedy, the provision was "unaccountably ... omitted from the bill
as finally approved." Robert A. Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 62 (1961). Professor Kessler considered the omission to be "unfortunate."
Id.
14. CLARK, supra note 8, § 18.4.3, at 797.
15. See infra Part m.C (discussing tension between principles of public law and private
ordering).
16. 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEhMENT
§ 41(aX7) (3d ed. Supp. 1998/99) [hereinafter MBCA-CC].
17. CAL. CORP. CODE § 308 (West Supp. 2002). Commentators consider California's
provisional director statute to be the "prototype of this form of relief." Charles E. Murphy Jr.,
Note,Revision of the North Carolina Statute's Corporate DeadlockProvisions, 51 N.C. L. REV.
815, 830 (1973); see also John W. Wall, Note, Corporations--The Court-Appointed Provi-
sional Director for Deadlocked Corporations, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 636 (1974)
(referring to California statute as "pioneer legislation on this subject").
18. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (2001). Delaware's code contains a separate subchapter
of special provisions devoted entirely to statutory close corporations. Id. §§ 341-56.
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appoint a provisional director only if the corporation's articles of incorporation
expressly provide for it. 9 Several jurisdictions state that the provisional
director possesses all the "rights, powers, and duties of a duly elected direc-
tor."20 However, other states conspicuously omit the reference to "duties" and
provide only that the provisional director has the same "rights and powers" of
a director."
The considerable variance with which states and courts have construed
the provisional director remedy reflects deep confusion over the remedy's
functions, goals, and limits. Although much attention has been given to other
forms ofjudicial relief for corporate deadlock, such as dissolution and buy-out,
no comprehensive review or analysis of the provisional director remedy has
been conducted, nor has a theory emerged that incorporates the competing
policy principles underlying the remedy. This Article provides a detailed
examination of the nature and scope of the provisional director remedy, the
status of state legislation and current judicial application concerning the
remedy, and the fundamental public and private interests that its use as a cure
for deadlock implicates. This Article formulates a new statutory model for
adoption in states' general corporations codes. The proposed model statute
sets forth an integrated and constructive method for implementing the provi-
sional director remedy as a first step toward resolving the internecine board-
room battles that often arise in corporations.
Part II of this Article begins with an overview of corporate deadlock and
pays particular attention to the problems faced by close corporations.22 The
provisional director remedy can be of particular interest to close corporations
19. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.911(A) (West 1994).
20. GA. CODEANN. § 14-2-941(aX7) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.855(7) (West 1991);
MONT. CODEANN. § 35-9-502(1)(g)(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410(aX7) (Law. Co-op.
1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2Xa)(7) (West 2002); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-
141 (a)(vii) (Michie 2001).
21. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(c) (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.640(b) (Michie 2000);
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 308(c) (West Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(c) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29.101-167(c) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(1) (West 2001); KAN. STAT.
CODE ANN. § 17-7213(c) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(2) (West Supp. 2002); NEv.
REV. STAT. 78A.150(3)(c) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp. 2002); 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(d) (West 1995); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcTANN. art. 12.53(B)(2) (Vernon
Supp. 2001).
22. A close corporation is "a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the
securities markets." I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 1.02. Generally, close corpora-
tions possess certain distinct features that make them very similar to partnerships. See Henry
F. Johnson, Strict Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations: A Concept in Search ofAdoption,
18 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 1 (1982) (comparing close corporations to partnerships and sole propri-
etorships); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV.
1143, 1153-54 (1989) (discussing comparison between close corporations and partnerships).
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because their unique characteristics make the likelihood of deadlock much
greater than in public corporations.23 Part II also attempts to provide some
context within which to view the position of the provisional director remedy
along the spectrum of available remedies.
Although a number of approaches to deal with director and shareholder
deadlock exist, one distinct set of alternatives involves the use of a neutral,
outside person to help resolve the dispute or manage the business. I refer to
these measures as "third-party alternatives." These alternatives include the
appointment by the court of custodians and temporary receivers to manage the
operations of the company and preserve its business as a going concern. Third-
party alternatives for corporate deadlock can also incorporate different forms
of dispute resolution, including arbitration, mediation, and a hybrid form
called mediation-arbitration. In many ways, the provisional director functions
much like an arbitrator, listening to the arguments of conflicting factions and
then deciding in favor of one side to break the tie. However, the provisional
director also serves in a mediating capacity as a fellow director in board
meetings where ideas are discussed and analyzed. Of course, if the provisional
director's efforts at mediation fail and the parties are unable to reach agree-
ment, the provisional director's role as a mediator must come to an end, and a
tie-breaking vote must be cast. This process mirrors what occurs in the
mediation-arbitration process. Part II discusses these various third-party
alternatives as they relate to the provisional director remedy.
23. See 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 9.02 (discussing problems of deadlock
in close corporations); see also 16A FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 8066.10 ("Shareholder or
management deadlock[s] usually occur in closely-held or family-owned corporations.").
Although public companies may occasionally experience deadlock, it theoretically can be
broken easily through the purchase of additional shares. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P.
Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close
Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 n. 10 (1977); see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPO-
RATIONS 381 (Aspen 1997) ("Deadlock is truly a phenomenon of the closely held corporation;
it would not long exist within the public corporation.").
Several states make the provisional director remedy available to close corporations
through the use of statutory provisions designed particularly for close corporations. ALA. CODE
§ 10-2A-310 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-941 (1994);
KAN. STAT. AN. § 17-7213 (1995); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
78A.150 (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334 (West 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-
410(aX7) (Law. Co-op. 1990); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.53 (Vernon Supp. 2001);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2XaX7) (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(a)(ii)
(Michie 2001). The problem with statutory close corporation provisions is that only those few
corporations that affirmatively elect close corporation status can take advantage of such
provisions. The vast majority of eligible corporations do not make that election. See I O'NEAL
& THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 1.19 (stating that, of those eligible for close corporation status,
5% or less elect such status).
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The appointment of a provisional director raises fundamental policy
concerns that Part III examines. The wide variance in the statutory and judicial
treatment of the provisional director remedy suggests a deeper conflict be-
tween competing policy principles. The remedy arguably infringes on share-
holder autonomy rights. Statutes uniformly guarantee shareholders basic
voting rights to elect the company's board of directors.24 When courts appoint
provisional directors to the board, courts arguably usurp the rights of share-
holders to make their own choices. This alteration of shareholder rights
becomes particularly clear in those states with statutes authorizing the appoint-
ment of provisional directors "notwithstanding any contrary provision of the
articles of incorporation or the bylaws or agreement of the shareholders."25 In
other words, even if shareholders have agreed among themselves that they
prefer never to have a provisional director in cases of deadlock, courts may
nonetheless appoint one. Such judicial interference with private contracting
may be problematic if one considers shareholder autonomy a primary value.
In addition, judicial interference raises concerns about the scope of the
court's authority and involvement in implementing the provisional director
remedy. When the court appoints a provisional director, a question arises as
to whether the court has delegated its judicial authority to the provisional
director in some measurable sense. If the provisional director is an officer of
the court-an extension of the court's own hand, making binding judgments
on disputed matters for the parties-then a number of intended and unintended
consequences may follow. For example, provisional directors, as proxies or
substitutes for the judges themselves, should be completely impartial and held
to the same standards as judges in avoiding even the appearance of bias.
Under this theory, current provisional director statutes that do not require
complete impartiality would be severely deficient; only those statutes that
mandate impartiality would be proper. Moreover, if the provisional director
is considered a judicial officer, an issue arises as to whether absolute judicial
immunity would extend to provisional directors. If so, provisional directors
would not be liable for the consequences of their decisions, even if those
decisions were made in bad faith.26 With this approach, state statutes that
24. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 21 l(b) (2001); see also 2 FLETCHER, supra note 6,
§ 283 (discussing inherent power of shareholders to elect corporation's directors and officers);
Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79
IOWA L. REv. 485, 497 (1994) ("Shareholder voting holds a position of central importance in
modem enabling statutes. A large portion of every modem corporate statute devotes itself to
voting in the corporation.").
25. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(a) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(a) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(a) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(a) (1995); NEv. REV. STAT.
78A.150(1) (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(a) (1995).
26. Absolute judicial immunity protects judges from liability for judicial acts and
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currently impose on provisional directors all the same "rights, powers, and
duties of duly elected directors" would be improper because provisional
directors would not be subject to the same fiduciary duties as ordinary direc-
tors.27 in contrast, if provisional directors are viewed simply as additional
directors with the same rights and powers of their fellow directors, the same
duties and obligations arguably should apply as well.
All of these questions reflect an uneasy tension between various public
and private interests. Part IV explores these competing considerations and
undertakes a broad critical analysis of the current scope of provisional director
legislation. Part IV argues that one of the reasons why statutes, as well as
courts, differ so much in constructing the provisional director remedy is
because they lack a balanced, integrated theory for viewing the function of
provisional directors.
In light of this deficiency, Part V proposes a model provisional director
statute that incorporates the interests of the corporation and the prerogatives
of the shareholders. The statute will give courts a clearer image of the role that
the provisional director should play in helping to resolve corporate deadlock.
The proposed model statute contained in this Article also addresses the immu-
nity of provisional directors, an issue that has heretofore remained completely
unaddressed in state provisional director legislation. This Article argues that
courts should extend qualified immunity to provisional directors who act in
good faith within the scope of their powers and duties.
II. Corporate Deadlock
A. Deadlock in Close Corporations
Deadlock generally refers to "an impasse in corporate decisional pro-
cesses."28 It can occur on two levels. First, the shareholders of the company
may be so divided that they are unable to elect directors as a result of a stale-
decisions made within their jurisdiction, "even if the judges are alleged to have been corrupt,
malicious, or negligent." ABrMBoLA A. OLOWoFOYEKU, SuNo JuDaES: A STUDY OF JUDIcIAL
IMMUNITY 33 (1993).
27. Corporate directors are subject to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. See
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § § 6.01-6.23,8.01-8.38 (1993) (explaining
director's duties of care and loyalty); FRANKLJN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW §§ 4.1-4.2
(2000) (same); HARRY 0. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 234-41
(3d ed. 1983) (same). Directors can be held liable for bad faith actions or omissions. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(bX7) (2001) (prohibiting corporations from limiting liability of
directors for "acts or omissions not in good faith").
28. Note, Deadlock in a Close Corporation: A Suggestion for Protecting a Dissident,
Co-Equal Shareholder, 1972 DUKE L.J. 653,654 [hereinafter Deadlock in a Close Corpora-
tion].
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mate in voting. Second, a division among the directors themselves may render
the board unable to take effective management action.29 In both cases, if the
deadlock is not resolved, the corporation's business may suffer serious impair-
ment that causes substantial commercial loss." Shareholders and directors
may be deadlocked on any number of issues. For example, they may disagree
on whether to use corporate surplus funds to issue dividends or reinvest the
funds in the business. They might deadlock over the election of officers or the
appropriate level of compensation they are to be paid. Deadlock is harmful
because it frustrates the exercise of important shareholder rights. Corporate
law upholds the "importance of participation in corporate decisionmaking as
an inherent element of the property right shareholders hold in their compa-
nies."3 Deadlock results in a breakdown in the decisionmaking process and
thereby thwarts shareholders' ability to obtain all the benefits of their owner-
ship rights.
Deadlock can occur in a number of ways. The most obvious is when two
shareholders, or two groups of shareholders, each own fifty percent of the
corporation's shares or when an even-numbered board of directors is equally
divided in two halves. A stalemate can also be reached if three or more share-
holders each own an equal number of shares, but refuse to join together to form
a majority. Supermajority requirements or veto rights given to minority
shareholders to protect them from oppression by the majority also have the
potential to create deadlock. These powers to veto majority decisions essen-
29. Statutes authorizing dissolution because of corporate deadlock typically encompass
both shareholder and director forms of deadlock. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(2), (3)
(West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104(aXl), (2) (McKinney Supp. 2002).
30. The corporate paralysis that results from deadlock prevents the corporation from
functioning economically and can lead to economic disaster. NORMAN D. LATTN, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONs § 180, at 635 (2d ed. 1971); Hugh H. Makens & Bruce C. Young, War and
Pieces: The Impact ofDeadlock in the Michigan Closely Held Corporation, 42 WAYNE L. REV.
1863, 1865-66 (1996) (describing negative effects of deadlock, including "[lI]osses from
operations or dramatic diminution of profit").
31. Hugh T. Scogin Jr., Withdrawal and Expulsion in Germany: A Comparative
Perspective on the "Close Corporation Problem", 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 173 (1993).
32. See Richard C. Tinney, Dissension orDeadlock of Corporate Directors orSharehold-
ers, 6 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 387, § 4 (1975) (explaining how odd numbers of sharehold-
ers may become deadlocked).
33. See MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 40, Official Cmt. I ("[D]eadlocks [can be] created
by veto rights given minority shareholders."); Deadlock in a Close Corporation, supra note 28,
at 654 (noting that vesting of veto powers in minority shareholders and setting of high voting
requirements for shareholder or director action greatly enhance possibility of corporate dead-
lock). Involuntary dissolution statutes recognize that supermajority voting requirements can
cause deadlock just as easily as an even division in voting power. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(a)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that deadlock can occur "because of [an]
even division in the number of directors or because of greater than majority voting requirements
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tially establish a unanimity requirement for the approval of proposed corporate
actions.34 Even without supermajority provisions, a minority shareholder may
be able to exercise effective control and produce deadlock when the share-
holder has specialized skills or knowledge upon which the business depends.
In essence, deadlock is possible whenever one corporate participant has the
ability to negate the power of the remaining participants to effectuate corporate
actions.
The distinguishing features of close corporations make them particularly
vulnerable to deadlock. Generally speaking, close corporations are composed
of a small number of shareholders who are actively engaged in management,
who hold shares that are not freely transferable or traded on an established
market, and who are likely to have a large portion of their wealth invested in
the business.3 They often contribute much of their time, energy, and money
to make the corporation a successful enterprise.36 The sole return on their
investment may be in the form of the salary they receive as active managers of
the company, and the salary, in turn, may constitute the only source of their
in the articles... or the by-laws").
34. See Olincy v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392 (Cal. Ct. App.
1962) (confirming validity of minimum voting requirements that have practical effect of
requiring unanimity); Stuart L. Pachman, Corporations Evenly Divided: Judicial Remedies for
Equal Shareholders, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 234, 237 n.9 (1993) ("Stalemate or deadlock is
also possible in corporations that have adopted high or unanimous vote requirements."). In
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), for example, four
shareholders each held equal interests in a corporation whose articles of incorporation required
all major corporate actions to be approved by an 80% vote of the outstanding stock, effectively
requiring unanimity. Id. at 799. Although three of the shareholders voted to use excess
corporate funds to issue dividends, the fourth continuously vetoed the action, creating an
irresolvable deadlock. Id. at 800-01.
35. See William S. Hochstetler & Mark D. Svejda, Empirical Research Project, Statutory
Needs of Close Corporations-An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or
Flexible General Corporation Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849, 852 (1985) (discussing unique
characteristics of close corporations); Mitchell, supra note 22, at 1151 (same); see also Israels,
supra note 5, at 778 (describing close corporation as one in which management and ownership
are substantially identical). Statutory definitions of close corporations often include a limit on
the maximum number of shareholders in the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 342(aX1) (2001) (limiting close corporation to maximum of 30 shareholders). See generally
I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 1.02 (discussing various definitions of close corpora-
tions).
36. William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy, The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders
in Closely Held Corporations Under Illinois Law, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 586 (1998). Close
corporations resemble partnerships, and the shareholders often view themselves as partners. I
F. HODGE O'NEAL& ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPREsSIoNoF MINoRTY SHAREHoLD-
ERS § 2:10 (2d ed. 1997); Johnson, supra note 22, at I (noting that close corporations preserve
intimacy and control features of partnerships).
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income. 37  Because no public market for their shares exists and because so
much of their wealth is tied up in one firm, close corporation shareholders face
a greater risk of loss than public corporation shareholders. If dissension
develops among the participants of the close corporation, shareholders who
wish to exit the firm may be unable to do so because they "cannot dissolve the
company at will like members of a partnership, nor can they sell their shares
on the open market like shareholders in a publicly held corporation. 3  Recog-
nizing that close corporations have these unique characteristics and special
needs, many states now provide greater statutory flexibility and protection for
close corporation shareholders. 9 For example, current statutes often explicitly
permit the establishment of supermajority voting requirements for shareholder
or director actions.40 This arrangement shields each shareholder from being
outvoted by the others and thereby provides greater protection for each share-
holder's investment. As mentioned previously, these voting protections can
increase the risk of deadlock."
37. See Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 36, at 586 ("Often, the shareholder's only return
on his investment is the salary the shareholder receives as compensation for a position within
the corporation."); Deadlock in a Close Corporation, supra note 28, at 654 (noting that close
corporation shareholders "expect[] to derive much, if not all, of their income in the form of
salaries for managerial services rendered the corporation"). Shareholders may also receive non-
monetary returns on their investment, including the psychological satisfaction that accompanies
running one's own business. Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the
Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in
Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 671 (1992).
38. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1386 (N.J. 1996); see also Raymond
G. Leffler, Dispute Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 ARB. J. 254,255 (1976) (contrast-
ing withdrawal capabilities in partnerships, public corporations, and close corporations);
Scogin, supra note 31, at 129 (explaining close corporation shareholder's inability to sever ties
with fellow shareholders).
39. Many states have made amendments or additions to their general corporations codes
that are intended to benefit close corporations, but are not expressly limited to them. See 1
O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 1.18 (discussing statutory close corporations supple-
ments). Some states, like Delaware, have enacted separate close corporation acts or subchapters
for corporations that elect to be treated as statutory close corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 341-56 (1991); see also Thompson, supra note 1, at 197-98 (discussing changes in statutory
norms toward greater flexibility for close corporations).
40. See I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 4.07 (discussing supermajority voting
requirements).
41. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing potential for deadlock); see
also Hochstetler & Svejda, supra note 35, at 854 (noting that unanimous vote requirements
increase potential for deadlock and therefore make deadlock more likely in close corporations
than in public corporations); Leffler, supra note 38, at 256 ("In the close corporation the
granting of veto power to all of the shareholders may enhance a risk of paralysis.").
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An important factor in the analysis of close corporation deadlock is that
the participants are often family members or close friends. Ninety-five percent
of all businesses in the United States are family-owned enterprises.42 The
family members who own and manage these companies have direct, personal
relationships, interacting with each other on a regular and frequent basis. The
intensity and intimacy of these bonds, along with the continuous interaction
both in and outside the business, can lead to strife or heightened conflicts and
misunderstandings between the participants.43 Sibling rivalry, competition
among generations, and corporate succession problems may paralyze the
business and contribute to its demise." Family and intergenerational dynamics
can exacerbate delicate balances of power existing within the corporation and
make the enterprise particularly vulnerable to deadlock.
Because of the increased potential for deadlock problems in close corpo-
rations, courts and legislatures have developed broad relief for shareholders.
Courts have the equitable power to order the dissolution of the corporation if
deadlock renders the corporation incapable of functioning effectively any
longer.45 Alternatively, courts may order the buy-out of one shareholder's
42. JOHN L. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BusiNESS HEALTHY, at xv (1987); see, e.g.,
Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 734 A.2d 721, 722 (N.J. 1999) (involving dispute
between two former friends who jointly owned business); Belfer v. Merling, 730 A.2d 434,
437-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (involving dispute among family members of close
corporation). When family members and friends enter business together, they embark on a
"cooperative adventure," purchasing "not stock, but a future." Joseph E. Olson, A Statutory
Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627, 629 (1985).
43. See I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 36, § 2:02 (discussing personality clashes and
family discord as factors in close corporation squeeze-outs); Lewis D. Solomon & Janet Stem
Solomon, Using Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques to Settle Conflicts Among Share-
holders of Closely Held Corporations, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 105 (1987) ("It is
notorious that no feuds are so venomous as those within families . . . ." (quoting Joseph W.
Bishop Jr., Book Review, 1976 DUKE L.J. 155, 158 (reviewing F. HODGE O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-
OuTS" OF MINORrTY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BushiNss AssocIATEs
(1975)))).
44. See WARD, supra note 42, at xv, 3 (discussing difficulties experienced by close
corporations held by families); see, e.g., Balsamides, 734 A.2d at 722-23 (describing acrimoni-
ous relationship that developed between two shareholders after both men brought their sons into
business); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (involving dispute
among three brothers who each owned interests in family close corporation).
45. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285,295 (1990). Most states have deadlock statutes authoriz-
ing the dissolution of the corporation upon director or shareholder deadlock. E.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-1430 (West 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(2), (3) (West 1990); N.Y.
BUS. CoRp. LAW § 1104(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2002); MBCA-CC,supra note 16, § 40. These
statutes also authorize dissolution upon a showing of fraudulent, oppressive, or illegal conduct
by the directors. This Article focuses primarily on the provisional director remedy as it relates
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shares by the corporation or by another shareholder,46 or the court can order a
partitioning of assets.47
Despite the availability of these remedies, shareholders who believe their
corporation has a promising future may not feel that dissolution or a forced
buy-out is an acceptable solution. They may have strong personal reasons for
keeping the company intact, "including loyalty to employees, strong views
about continuation of the company name and work, or the ability to keep
younger family members involved in the business." '49 Even though buy-out
remedies give deadlocked shareholders the ability to exit a difficult situation,
the shareholders may not necessarily wish to leave, particularly if they feel
they have poured considerable time and energy, not to mention their heart and
soul, into the success of the enterprise up to that point.
In lieu of dissolution or buy-out of one side by the other, different alterna-
tives designed to preserve the ongoing nature of the business and to break the
corporate deadlock by bringing in an outside neutral third party are available.
These third-party alternatives may be effective either because they give the
bitterly disputing parties an opportunity to calm down for a period of time or
because they facilitate a resolution of the contested issues. The following
subparts briefly describe these alternatives, including the provisional director
remedy.
to deadlock, rather than to oppression.
46. See, e.g., Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1324-25 (D.S.C. 1987) (ordering forced
buy-out in lieu of dissolution); see also Folk, supra note 11, at 954-56 (discussing compulsory
buy-out remedy for deadlock in close corporations). One difficult issue in buy-out situations
is determining the fair value of the shares to be purchased or sold. See, e.g., Balsamides, 734
A.2d at 733-38 (analyzing valuation methods for fair value of shares in ordered buy-out); see
also Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remediesfor Minority Shareholders and
Its Impact upon Valuation of Minoriy Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 471-88 (1990)
(discussing minority and liquidity discounts in valuing shares for purposes of judicially ordered
buy-out); Thompson, supra note 1, at 231-36 (discussing valuation procedures in buy-outs).
Another difficult question concerns which of the parties should be given the purchase option.
See, e.g., Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1389-90 (N.J. 1996) (choosing to order
sale of majority shareholder's shares to minority shareholder after consideration of equities).
47. See Bahis, supra note 45, at 305-06 (discussing courts' ability to partition corporate
property among shareholders if possible to divide business "in accordance with prorated
ownership interest"). Partitioning the assets would involve the division of the corporation into
two or more firms. If the assets cannot be severed into economically viable units, the remedy
loses its utility. See Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (D.S.C. 1987) (declining to order
division of corporation because partitioning of certain assets such as customer accounts might
"generate continued animosity and additional litigation").
48. See F. Hodge O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-
InstitutionalArbitration, 67 HARV. L. REV. 786, 787 (1954) (asserting that dissolution may not
be acceptable to shareholders if corporation is prosperous).
49. Makens & Young, supra note 30, at 1892 n.l 13.
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B. Third-Party Alternatives and Forms of Relief
1. Custodians and Temporary Receivers
When corporate participants are unable to agree on critical business
decisions necessary to advance the operations of the company, a court may
appoint a custodian or temporary receiver to manage the affairs of the corpora-
tion until the conflicts are resolved.50 The terms "custodian" and "temporary
receiver" are often used interchangeably and are to be distinguished from
receivers who are appointed to wind up the corporation and liquidate its
assets.5 The custodian has the power to take over and maintain all operations
of the deadlocked corporation until the parties can reach agreement and resume
management of the corporation's affairs. Because the custodian is vested with
the ability to exercise all of the powers of the board of directors, the custodian
effectively replaces the board as the decisionmaking body of the corporation. 2
50. Cheryl Jean Lew, Comment, The Custodian RemedyforDeadlocks in Close Corpora-
tions, 13 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 498, 508-09 (1980); Murphy, supra note 17, at 822. Statutes
authorizing the custodian remedy may apply to both general and close corporations. The
statutes typically specify shareholder or director deadlock as one of the grounds for ordering the
remedy. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (1991) (stating that custodial appointment is
available if shareholders of close corporation "are so divided that the business of the corporation
is suffering or is threatened with irreparable injury"). See generally 2 O'NEAL &THOMPSON,
supra note 11, § 9.34 (discussing custodian remedy).
51. Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315,322 (W.D. Pa. 1982); 16 FLETCHER, supra note
6, § 7713; see also Valley View State Bank v. Owen, 737 P.2d 35, 38 (Kan. 1987) ("A custo-
dian is appointed to continue the business of the corporation, and, unless the court otherwise
directs, not to liquidate its assets."); Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary
Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 28
n.1 1 (1987) (stating that custodians preserve business whereas receivers liquidate assets).
Statutes providing for the appointment of custodians clarify the scope of the custodian's powers.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6516 (West 1975) ("[T]he authority of the custodian is to
continue the business of the corporation and not to liquidate its affairs and distribute its
assets.... ."); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(c) (West 1995) ("[T]he authority of the custo-
dian shall be to continue the business of the corporation and not to liquidate its affairs and
distribute its assets .... "). For a thorough discussion of permanent receivers who take full title
to the corporate property and are charged with the task of winding up the corporation and
distributing its assets for the benefit of the creditors and shareholders, see 16A FLETCHER, supra
note 6, §§ 8196-8216.
52. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 23, at 24 (stating that custodian is given full
authority of board of directors until court restores control to board); Murphy, supra note 17, at
830 (noting that custodian is responsible for making decisions that directors were formerly
collectively responsible for making). Some statutes permit the custodian's powers to be
exercised through or in conjunction with the current board. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:12-7(4) (West Supp. 2002) (providing that powers of custodian "may be exercised
directly or through, or in conjunction with, the corporation's board or officers, in the discretion
of the custodian or as the court may order"); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.32(cX2) (1998)
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Appointing a custodian is less severe than ordering dissolution. It
provides the parties with the opportunity to attempt to break the deadlock
themselves by giving them "a sufficient cooling off period" to restore their
relationship. 3 The presence of the custodian also encourages the parties to
resolve their differences quickly so that the outsider may be removed from
managing the business for them.
One of the drawbacks of appointing a custodian or temporary receiver is
the potential negative impact it will have on the company's relationship with
its creditors, suppliers, and customers. These groups may view the appoint-
ment of the custodian as an indication that the corporation is financially
troubled, and they may consequently demand greater protections or refuse to
approve further extensions of credit.54 In a broader sense, the custodian's
effectiveness is limited because businesses typically "will not prosper as well
in the hands of an outside custodian."" Custodians in effect maintain the
status quo; they are appointed to preserve the operations of the business, not
to maximize its profitability.
Critics of the custodian remedy argue that it unduly intrudes on the
management of private business and wrests control of the corporation from
those who are entitled to run the business. 6 Because the appointment of a
custodian "involves the complete relocation of corporate control,"57 some
commentators have suggested that the remedy may be better utilized in
[hereinafter MBCA] (allowing custodian to exercise powers "through or in place of (the
corporation's] board of directors or officers").
53. Note, Deadlock and Dissolution in Close Corporations, 45 IoWA L. REv. 767, 773
(1960).
54. See Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can IDofor You? Remedies for Oppressed Sharehold-
ers in New Jersey, N.J. LAW. MAG., August 2000, at 37, 39 (noting that creditors may insist on
greater protection once custodian is appointed); cf In re Jamison Steel Corp., 322 P.2d 246, 250
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (discussing negative effects on corporation's credit once receiver is
appointed).
55. Thompson, supra note 1, at 230. The custodian remedy is only a temporary solution.
"Sooner, rather than later, the participants will need to arrive at a better accommodation of their
respective interests, or a different remedy will be required." Id.
56. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 830 (noting that disadvantage of custodian remedy is
that it takes all control from directors); see also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 23, at 24
(noting that custodianships "substitute judicially controlled management for management by the
owners"); Lew, supra note 50, at 512 ("ITlhe custodian's power over the corporation can result
in excessive judicial interference into private business. . . ."). If the custodian is appointed to
run the affairs of the entire business, the custodian's powers could potentially be quite broad,
including the power to declare dividends, hire and fire employees, and set salaries. Id. at 513
(citing Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974)).
57. Murphy, supra note 17, at 823.
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situations involving evidence of fraudulent or oppressive conduct by one
faction.5" Presumably, by taking management powers from the offending
shareholders, the custodian can stop the improper conduct and prevent eco-
nomic loss to the corporation.
2. Arbitration
Arbitration is another third-party alternative for deadlocked corporations.
Arbitration involves the use of a neutral outsider who considers the claims of
the disputing parties and renders a binding decision.59 It has become a very
common method for resolving disputes in close corporations.'
58. See Pachman, supra note 10, at 14 ("[A] custodian may be more appropriate where
there is intentional wrongdoing, self-dealing, mismanagement or serious fraudulent or illegal
acts."); see also Haynsworth, supra note 51, at 28 (noting that custodial receiver remedy works
best when majority shareholders have committed fraudulent activity); Lew, supra note 50, at
510 (observing that custodian remedy is preferable when shareholders have committed fraudu-
lent and illegal acts).
59. 0. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 521
(1989); Solomon & Solomon, supra note 43, at 116. Once the arbitrator renders a decision, the
award may be converted into a judgment in court pursuant to federal and state arbitration
statutes. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (giving arbitration parties right to submit arbitration award
to court for judge to issue order confirming award); Unif. Arbitration Act § 22, 7 U.L.A. 41
(Supp. 2002) (allowing party to make motion to court for order confirming arbitration award);
Shell, supra, at 523 (stating that federal and state statutes allow courts to convert arbitrator's
decision into judgment through judicial confirmation). After the arbitration award is made, it
is extremely difficult to challenge the decision because statutes provide for only limited rights
to appeal. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000) (limiting grounds for vacation of arbitration awards
to situations in which party procured award by corruption, fraud, undue means, misconduct, or
evident partiality on part of arbitrator). One commentator has estimated that the number of
arbitration awards that are challenged each year is "less than two hundred out of more than
twenty-five thousand (perhaps as many as forty thousand)" awards. Edgar A. Jones Jr., Selected
Problems of Procedure and Evidence, in ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 48, 49 (Arnold M. Zack
ed., 1984).
60. See Shell, supra note 59, at 534 (referring to arbitration of close corporation disputes
as "a matter of everyday practice"). Traditionally, arbitration was a disfavored approach
because there was concern that decisionmaking by outside arbitrators divested the board of
directors of its power and obligation to manage the corporation's affairs. Id. at 530. Today,
most state statutes uphold private arbitration agreements. See 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 11, § 9.11 (stating that arbitration clauses are generally accepted in close corporations);
see, e.g., MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(2) (West 2000) ("A provision in a written
contract to settle by arbitration... shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable. . . ."); MBCA-
CC, supra note 16, § 20 & Official Cmt. (authorizing close corporation shareholder agreements
that require arbitration of issues over which shareholders or directors are deadlocked). See
generally IANR. MACNEILAMERICAN ARBrrRATION LAW 83-155(1992) (discussing national-
ization of American arbitration law).
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As a means of resolving disputes, arbitration is generally considered to
be less expensive and less time-consuming than litigation." It affords the
participants greater privacy, a feature that may be highly valued by close
corporation shareholders who do not wish to air their family disputes in the
public setting associated with litigation.62 Arbitrators who have business
expertise and familiarity with the company or the industry can render a
decision that reflects a deeper understanding of the issues, increasing the
likelihood that the parties will be satisfied with the judgment.6 The average
civil litigation judge may not have comparable specialized knowledge or the
time to develop the same level of expertise. Arbitrators are not necessarily
bound by precedent or formal rules of evidence and procedure, and arbitrators
therefore have the flexibility to tailor their decisions specifically for the
parties.64 Unlike custodianships, arbitration does not entail the insertion of the
outside third party into the corporation, nor does it involve the complete
surrendei of corporate control. The parties remain in control of the business
as they take their dispute to the outside arbitrator for judgment.
61. 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 9.09; Leffler, supra note 38, at 258;
Solomon & Solomon, supra note 43, at 117. Courts have also recognized the value of arbitra-
tion in close corporation disputes. See, e.g., Siegel v. Ribak, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903,909 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1964) (encouraging arbitration in close corporation disputes). In fact, courts will enforce
arbitration agreements between shareholders and stay any petition for dissolution pending the
arbitration. E.g., Siegel v. 141 Bowery Corp., 362 N.Y.S.2d 897,901-02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974),
aff'd, 380 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
62. See S.S.J. Jr., Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate
Disputes, 56 VA. L. REV. 271, 285 (1970) (noting that advantage of arbitration in close
corporation disputes.is privacy); Note, Arbitration as a Means of Settling Disputes Within Close
Corporations, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 286 (1963) (suggesting that arbitration allows "corpora-
tion and its owners to avoid the adverse publicity incidental to judicial proceedings"). The
private nature of arbitration proceedings may also be important to parties who wish to preserve
certain corporate secrets. See Hochstetler & Svejda, supra note 35, at 971-92 (noting that
arbitration "safeguard[s] corporate secrets"); Makens & Young, supra note 30, at 1887 (discuss-
ing advantage of privacy in arbitration proceedings).
63. O'Neal, supra note 48, at 790; Murphy, supra note 17, at 824; see also Stephen K.
Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts ofInterest, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 915,917 (2001)
(noting that arbitrators are commonly chosen "precisely because they have considerable
knowledge about the subject matter of the arbitration"); Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255
(1987) (stating that arbitrators may know more about subject matter of dispute than judges or
juries).
64. See S.S.J., supra note 62, at 286-87 (discussing procedural advantages of arbitration);
see also Jones, supra note 59, at 52 (noting that "legal rules, procedures, and evidence are not
legally required" in arbitration); Lefiler, supra note 38, at 258 (noting arbitrators' flexibility in
making decisions).
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Arbitration has its limitations. Although less formal than litigation,
arbitration does have adjudicative elements. The process can be somewhat
intimidating, and it often requires the involvement of the parties' lawyers.6
Like judges, arbitrators may be asked to listen to witnesses, entertain the
presentation of arguments from both sides, and impose decisions that result
in binary, win-lose outcomes for the parties." These outcomes may not
address the real reasons why the deadlock occurred in the first place. Arbitra-
tors are constrained in their ability to restore consensus between the parties
and to resolve the personal grievances that underlie many of the disputes in
close corporations. A single arbitration may not be an effective solution if the
conflicts are deep and the parties subsequently deadlock over a continuing
stream of issues.
3. Mediation
Mediation offers an alternative for close corporation shareholders who
are deeply divided and likely to remain so unless they are able to identify and
deal with the core reasons for their conflict. In mediation, a neutral third party
facilitates communication and negotiation between the parties to move them
toward a mutually acceptable resolution.'? The goal is to "transform[] the
relationship from conflict to cooperation ' as the mediator helps the parties
move past their hostility to address their real interests. 9 The mediator has no
authority to impose a final decision upon the parties; rather, the mediator
listens to the parties, promotes understanding between them, and utilizes
creative problem-solving methods for resolving the tensions at the root of the
65. See Ronald W. Haughton, Running the Hearing, in ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 37
(Arnold M. Zack ed., 1994) (discussing nature of arbitration hearings); Jones, supra note 59,
at 50-55 (describing process of arbitration hearing); see also Unif. Arbitration Act § 16, 7
U.L-A. 32 (Supp. 2002) (providing for representation of arbitration parties by lawyers).
66. In this regard, the arbitration process retains the adversarial structure of the litigation
model. Thus, commentators have referred to arbitration as "quasi-adjudicatory." Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution andAdjudication, 10 OHIO ST.
J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211,218 (1995).
67. KnMABERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PINcipLEs AND PRACTICE 17 (1994).
68. Carole Silver, Models of Qualily for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 37, 76 (1996); see Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and
Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308, 325 (1971) (noting that objectives of mediation are to
"bring[] about a more harmonious relationship between the parties" and "to reorient the parties
toward each other").
69. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 2, 22-23 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing role of mediators in
overcoming barriers to resolution).
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conflict. The process is less adversarial than arbitration and is conducted
much more informally."
The mediation process is particularly valuable in situations in which
some emotional hostility is present7' or in which parties generally must main-
tain a continued relationship," two factors that often coalesce in family close
corporation disputes. The conflicts between the parties may have grown to
the point that each side refuses to capitulate on even the smallest issue be-
cause of a desire simply to harm the other side. In such cases, the mediator
may be able to engage the parties in integrative bargaining so that the parties
gain more by compromising and trading for what each side values most.73 The
70. The mediator is not limited by the same rules of evidence and procedure that bind
judges or even arbitrators who may be constrained by certain rules of formality. See, e.g., Jones,
supra note 59, at 49-50 (discussing formal practice of swearing in witnesses under oath in
arbitration hearings). In mediation, the parties can vent their feelings and concerns, even if such
statements would be technically "irrelevant" in a court of law. See Solomon & Solomon, supra
note 43, at 121 (noting that in mediation "what a party deems relevant is relevant"); see also
FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION 57 (1997) (contrasting mediators
who are able to provide full and undivided attention to parties with judges who have other cases
and administrative pressures that preclude them from devoting extensive time and attention to
any one case); L. Randolph Lowry, Preparing Your Client... For Mediation, DIsP. RESOL. J.,
Aug. 1998, at 30, 36 ("[lt is important for clients to express, sometimes quite emotionally, their
view of the conflict and its implications. The adversarial system stifles [that].").
71. Mediation can be "an attractive alternative when the issues are complicated or involve
strong feelings." ROBERT COULSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: MANAGING CONFLICT, RESOLVING
DIsPUTES 16 (2d ed. 1996). In the context of close corporation disputes, the function of the
mediator would be to get the parties "to put their emotions behind them and work out rational,
commercially reasonable outcomes." James C. Freund, Anatomy of a Split-Up: Mediating the
BusinessDivorce, 52 Bus. LAw. 479,484 (1997).
72. See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 12
(1996) (emphasizing that "[m]ediation's forte is to work with disputes involving future relation-
ships"); Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelinesfor Ensuring Fair
and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1091 (1990) [hereinafter Mandatory
Mediation] (noting that mediation is beneficial for parties who must interact on regular basis
in future dealings). Particularly in the close corporation context, the parties are locked into a
relationship that is not easy to exit. In a sense, "each is dependent for its very existence on some
collaboration with the other ... [, and] they simply must find some way of getting along with
one another." Fuller, supra note 68, at 310. The types of relationships that mediation presup-
poses are those that have "some strong internal pull toward cohesion." Id. at 314.
73. See Mandatory Mediation, supra note 72, at 1092 (noting that, in mediation, parties
can make concessions on issues they discount in order to gain ground on issues they view as
important). If parties do not place the same value on things, they can ultimately achieve more
satisfying results by "trading for what they value more but what the other party values less."
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663, 2673 (1995). Professor Menkel-
Meadow graphically describes this type of resolution as a "divi[sion] of goods, not in half, but
by interest, so that a piece of chocolate cake is divided into cake and icing." Id. at 2672.
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process of mediation may be especially effective for close corporation dis-
putes because the parties, as business people, understand the nature of creative
problem-solving, brainstorming, devising options, and risk-taking. 4 If the
mediator can help the parties overcome the emotional barriers that prevent
them from rationally approaching their problems, the parties can use their own
skills to forge a mutually acceptable solution.
Unlike the custodian remedy, which removes control from the sharehold-
ers, and the arbitration process, which imposes a final decision on them,
mediation gives the parties a greater level of control over their own outcome.
The parties may be more likely to adhere to and feel satisfied with an agree-
ment they have taken part in forming.
75
Mediation most likely cannot work if the parties' relationship has deterio-
rated to the point of being extremely adversarial. Even if the parties are
willing to engage in mediation, the informal and voluntary nature of the
process may limit its effectiveness. The parties' freedom to end the mediation
without any agreement at all can reduce the likelihood that the parties will
continue the process through to completion. The fact that the mediator has no
real power to direct the parties' actions or render a final decision may induce
the parties to take the mediation less seriously. 6 In this regard, mediation
lacks the certainty of a formal binding resolution.
4. Mediation-Arbitration (Med-Arb)
A hybrid form of dispute resolution combines mediation and arbitration
to capture the benefits of both methods. Mediation-arbitration, or med-arb,
involves the use of a neutral third party who acts first as a mediator between
the parties in an attempt to reach a voluntary agreement. If the mediation
phase fails to resolve all the disputed issues, the process switches to arbitra-
tion, and the third party renders a binding decision on the remaining points of
74. Lowry, supra note 70, at 34. It may be "relatively easy to get business clients to think
creatively-that is how businesspeople are trained ... [and] their business success depends on
it." Id.
75. Empirical studies indicate that the majority of participants in mediation tend to reach
an agreement, tend to be satisfied with the outcome and the process, and tend to comply with
the terms and conditions of the agreement over time. Michael Benjamin & Howard H. Irving,
Research in Family Mediation: Review and Implications, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1995, at 53,
57-58, 64; see also Lowry, supra note 70, at 36 ("Those who are satisfied with a decision are
much more likely to comply with it.").
76. Sherry Landry, Med-Arb: Mediation with a Bite and an Effective ADR Model, 63
DEF. CouNs. J. 263,264 (1996); see also Solomon & Solomon, supra note 43, at 124 (identify-
ing mediator's lack of power to induce settlement or enforce compliance as shortcoming of
mediation).
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disagreement." Med-arb affords the parties the opportunity to engage in the
cooperative aspects of mediation, while providing the parties with the cer-
tainty of a final decision.
Med-arb may create incentives for the parties to participate in the media-
tion with sincerity and good faith because they know that if they do not
resolve the dispute themselves, they will lose control over the outcome, and
a third party will impose a final resolution upon them."8 The parties are more
likely to approach the bargaining table with their honest demands, rather than
advancing extreme positions that have no possibility of being accepted. 9 The
mediator-arbitrator can play an active role in mediating the dispute and
addressing the parties' underlying interests, something that the typical arbitra-
tor is constrained from doing in the more formal atmosphere of traditional
arbitration."' Med-arb may be a more efficient process because, if the media-
tion does not succeed, the mediator-arbitrator, who is already familiar with the
parties, their dispute, and their respective positions, is in a position to make
a quicker decision than an outside third party who must begin anew."'
Some empirical research has confirmed the greater effectiveness of med-
arb in comparison to straight mediation. In one study, disputants were more
conciliatory and less hostile under med-arb than under mediation alone; the
med-arb disputants made more new proposals for settlement and tended to
77. Barry C. Bartel, Comment, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution:
History, Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 664-65 (1991); see also
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 246-71 (1985) (discussing med-arb
process).
78. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 77, at 265; see also Landry, supra note 76, at 264-65
(suggesting that parties will make greater effort to reach voluntary agreement when they know
that they are under threat of arbitration); Karen L. Henry, Note, Med-Arb: An Alternative to
InterestArbitration in the Resolution of Contract Negotiation Disputes, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 385, 390 (1988) (stating that presence of mediator-arbitrator and threat of arbitrated
decision "creates tremendous incentive for the parties to successfully mediate their dispute").
79. This tendency to be more honest and straightforward is said to be in contrast to what
occurs in arbitration. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 77, at 265 (noting that parties tend to
advance extreme positions in arbitration in hopes of getting larger recovery). But see James T.
Peter, Note, Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83, 97 (1997)
(discussing argument that parties are likely to be less frank in mediation because they know that
mediator-arbitrator has "decisional power" and may ultimately use damaging disclosures against
them).
80. See Bartel, supra note 77, at 665 (noting that mediator-arbitrator plays more active
role than arbitrator); Henry, supra note 78, at 393-94 (contrasting formality of arbitration to
informality of med-arb).
81. See WIuAmL. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUrES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 57 (1988) (noting efficiency of med-arb); see also Henry, supra
note 78, at 393 (discussing med-arb's ability to save time and costs).
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offer more concessions during the negotiations. 2 Although some critics
challenge the use of the same person as the mediator and the arbitrator in med-
arb,"3 the same study found that when a different person acted as the arbitrator
after the mediation phase, the mediator was less active and less involved, and
the disputants tended to be less creative. 4 Apparently vesting the mediator-
arbitrator with the power to make a binding decision encourages the parties
to engage in creative problem-solving and to reach agreement in the mediation
stage.
For these reasons, the med-arb approach may be helpful in .'orporate
deadlock situations. In fact, arbitration, mediation, med-arb, and the 6ustodian
remedy can each provide a unique means of assisting disputants caught in
82. Neil B. McGillicuddy et al., Third-Party Intervention: A Field Experiment Compar-
ing Three Different Models, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 104, 110 (1987); see also
Dean 0. Pruitt, Solutions Not Winners, PSYCHOL. ToDAY, Dec. 1987, at 58, 60 (discussing
results of same study). Under med-arb, the participants seemed more motivated to reach
agreement and showed greater respect for the mediator. Id. The researchers hypothesized that
the greater motivation to please the mediator may have been "due to the respect that' is naturally
given to a person who has the power to make decisions about one's welfare." McOillicuddy et
al., supra, at 110.
83. One set of concerns is that the skills needed to be an effective mediator are not the
same as those needed to be an effective arbitrator and, therefore, it should not be assumed that
the same person should act in both roles. See Silver, supra note 68, at 78 n.103 (quoting British
solicitor who explained that some arbitrators do not make good mediators because they "are too
used to sitting back and hearing evidence rather than working with the people towards . . . a
solution that will settle their differences"). Respondents to this argument dismiss this concern
as merely a "practical problem" that can be solved by finding someone who has the necessary
skills in both areas. E.g., Peter, supra note 79, at 97. A separate concern involves the potential
for coercion when the same person acts as the mediator-arbitrator. See Bartel, supra note 77,
at 679-80 (noting that mediator-arbitrator may abuse power). If the mediator-arbitrator firmly
pushes one or both parties toward settlement during the mediation stage, the parties may feel
compelled to accept settlement out of fear of antagonizing the mediator-arbitrator, who will be
the ultimate decisionmaker in the arbitration phase. The resolution then may not be the one the
parties would have voluntarily accepted had they known a different person would be assigned
to arbitrate the case if they could not reach a mediated settlement. See URY ET AL., supra note
81, at 57 ("What appears to be a negotiated resolution may be perceived by the parties as an
imposed one, thus diminishing the degree of satisfaction and commitment."). McGillicuddy's
med-arb research found that mediators who also acted as arbitrators did act forcefully in the
mediation session, advocating certain positions and threatening to end the sessions if no
progress were made. However, these tactics were used only at the end of sessions, suggesting
a "last-ditch effort" to save the mediation, "rather than a policy of forceful advocacy."
McGillicuddy et al., supra note 82, at 110; Pruitt, supra note 82, at 61. Critics also fear that
using the same person to mediate and arbitrate the dispute compromises the integrity of the
adjudicative role because it improperly allows the arbitrator to use information learned in
confidence in the mediation phase against the parties in the arbitration phase. Freund, supra
note 71, at 530; Solomon & Solomon, supra note 43, at 126; Henry, supra note 78, at 396-97.
84. McGillicuddy et al., supra note 82, at 11; Pruitt, supra note 82, at 61.
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deadlock. As discussed below, the provisional director remedy draws on and
combines many of the features of these various approaches.
C. Provisional Director Remedy: A Snapshot
A provisional director is a neutral third party who is appointed by the
court and vested with the rights and powers of a director to vote at board
meetings."5 The provisional director acts as a type of in-house arbitrator with
the power to vote to break deadlocks. 6 At the same time, the provisional
director serves a mediating function by facilitating communication between
the parties at board meetings and offering new ideas or alternatives for resolv-
ing the contested issues. In this regard, the provisional director remedy
appears to share many of the same characteristics as med-arb as a form of
dispute resolution: the provisional director listens to the parties state their
positions and vent their emotions, attempts to help them reach some type of
agreement and, failing that, votes to break the tie. The remedy is less severe
than the appointment of a custodian or receiver who takes over the manage-
ment of the business entirely. The provisional director cannot initiate actions
over the objections of the other directors, nor can the provisional director shift
control of the business operations away from the owners. 7
Various advantages are associated with the provisional director remedy.
It avoids the dissolution of the corporation and enables the business to con-
tinue operating as a going concern in the hands of its current owners. Share-
85. 16A FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 8043. Many statutes authorizing the appointment of
provisional directors make their voting authority explicit. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8,
§ 353(c) (2001) (providing that "a provisional director shall have all the rights and powers of
a duly elected director of the corporation, including the right ... to vote at meetings of direc-
tors").
86. See Folk, supra note 11, at 953 (stating that "procedure is essentially a means of
compelling the warring shareholders and directors to accept a type of arbitration"); Mason
Willrich, Comment, Unusual Statutory Remedies for the Deadlocked Corporation in Califor-
nia: Voluntary Dissolution and the Provisional Director, 48 CAL. L. REV. 272, 281 (1960)
(stating that provisional director remedy is "akin to compulsory arbitration"); supra Part II.B.2
(discussing arbitration).
87. See In re Annrhon, Inc., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
provisional director cannot "override a decision of the board ...[nor] take over ultimate
management from the owners"); Bahls, supra note 45, at 310 (noting that, because provisional
directors have "only one vote, [they] cannot initiate actions over the objections of the other
directors"); Thompson, supra note 1, at 229 (observing that "the provisional director lacks the
authority to act alone and can only combine with other directors to create the necessary majority
required for corporate action"). But see Mitzner v. Lights 18 Inc., 660 A.2d 512, 514 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (referring to the provisional director as a person who was "appointed
by the court to run Lights 18").
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holders of successful companies presumably wish "to restore rather than to
destroy the symbiotic relationship which was once the source of mutual
wealth."s Like the custodian remedy, the appointment of a provisional
director buys the parties some time to cool off and attempt to reestablish
cooperation with each other. However, in contrast to custodianships, the
provisional director remedy allows the parties to stay in charge of the com-
pany and involves less disruption to the business."9 Moreover, the appoint-
ment of a provisional director does not draw the same alarm from the corpora-
tion's creditors and suppliers as the appointment of a custodian or receiver.'
The mere presence of the third-party director at meetings may reduce
some of the hostility between the parties. The introduction of an outsider
tends to put the parties on their best behavior.9 They see the outsider as
someone who is judging them, but who is also there to help the corporation;
accordingly, each side wants the outsider to view it as being fair, reasonable,
and mindful of the corporation's best interests.' The provisional director's
votes could possibly help alter the direction of corporate activity so that the
likelihood of future deadlock is minimized."s Even if the deadlock cannot be
88. S.S.J., supra note 62, at 287. When the corporation has been successful, solutions
that keep the business going in the hands of those who have made it profitable are often
preferable to solutions calling for dissolution. Leffler, supra note 38, at 256. Even when
dissolution will result in the buy-out of one shareholder, the shareholder may prefer to be
temporarily "locked in" to realize greater future gains rather than be bought out at a discounted
price that does not reflect the going concern value of the business. Murdock, supra note 46, at
447.
89. See Haynsworth, supra note 51, at 27 (referring to provisional director device as being
"less intrusive on management prerogatives"). As a temporary addition to the board, the
provisional director does not permanently alter the corporation's ownership structure or balance
of power. 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 9.33.
90. See Bahls, supra note 45, at 310 (noting that "a provisional director does not create
the stigma of a court-appointed agent operating the business" and that "[tiherefore, damage to
relationships with creditors and customers is minimized"). The provisional director's presence
does not necessarily strike creditors and debtors of the company as being a major change in
management, whereas the appointment of a custodian may be a sign of possible insolvency.
Lew, supra note 50, at 514.
91. See Jeffrey A. Barach, Is There a Cure for the Paralyzed Family Board?, SLOAN
MOMT. REV., Fall 1984, at 3, 6, 10 (noting that bringing outsiders onto boards "forces the
discussion process to be held on an adult level" and suppresses "childish and inappropriate
behavior"); see also Fuller, supra note 68, at 309 (observing that "mere presence of a third
person tends to put the parties on their good behavior").
92. Cf John A. Fiske,Mediation, in I MASS. FAM. LAW MANUAL § 4.7.2 (1996) (discuss-
ing parties' subtle need for approval of mediator and parties' desire to be seen as good or fair).
93. See Folk, supra note 11, at 953 (stating that "the deadlock-breaking votes of a
provisional director may so change the direction of corporate activity that deadlock will not
recur"). In situations in which the deadlock persists, the provisional director's "impartial views
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cured, however, the provisional director remedy may be the most useful "first
step" in attempting to provide relief for corporate deadlock.94
The "first step" nature of the provisional director remedy is arguably one
of its disadvantages. If the parties have become completely incompatible, the
appointment of a provisional director may be futile and may only delay the
inevitable break-up of the company.9" The remedy involves higher transaction
costs because the parties must return to the court for more serious relief if the
remedy fails.' Proponents of the provisional director remedy counter that the
remedy should not be discounted merely because it might not always be the
final solution for deadlock. 7 The fact that the remedy may help save the
corporation and its shareholders from the devastating effects of deadlock may
make it worth a try.
However, the provisional director remedy may be problematic on more
fundamental grounds. It deprives resisting shareholders of their right to veto
managerial decisions by vesting in a court-appointed stranger the authority
essentially to override the veto.9" This raises deeper questions about the
on the problems at hand may help reconcile the discordant directors." David E. Rosenbaum,
Comment, The ProvisionalDirector Statute, 31 Mo. L. REV. 536, 540 n.29 (1966).
94. Wall, supra note 17, at 637; see also Lew, supra note 50, at 515 (discussing flexibility
of courts to order "milder provisional director remedy first"). Shareholders themselves often
recognize the value of this approach. See, e.g., Ironite Products Co. v. Samuels, 17 S.W.3d 566,
569 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that one shareholder wrote to another shareholder suggesting
that they would benefit from "objective tie-breaking director").
95. See In re O'Brien Machinery, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)
(noting that provisional director who served on board of deadlocked corporation for one year
sought to be removed, alleging that remedy was not adequate to deal with shareholders' severe
dissension); Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 129-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (finding
that continued presence of provisional director would not solve ongoing divergence between
two equally divided shareholders and that only feasible remedy was to order buy-out of one
shareholder's interests).
96. See Bahls, supra note 45, at 327 (discussing transaction costs of resolving shareholder
dissension); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 23, at 25 (noting that "judicially monitored
management is costly to the judicial system and to the parties").
97. Murphy, supra note 17, at 832. Hodge O'Neal addressed similar arguments against
arbitration fifty years ago. He argued that the "pessimistic view" that dissolution is the only
remedy for severe deadlock "fails to give proper weight to the moral force of arbitration and the
disposition of men to accept a determination fairly arrived at by disinterested persons." O'Neal,
supra note 48, at 792. Commentators have suggested that virtually any remedy that does not
alter the structure of the corporation or the identity of its participants may be only postponing
the implementation of more drastic remedies. E.g., Murphy, supra note 17, at 832.
98. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 23, at 21 (noting that "[n]o state or public
interest appears to justify depriving the resisting party of the right to veto corporate decisions").
The veto power is an important device for protecting shareholder interests in close corporations.
Professors Hetherington and Dooley argue that the appointment of a provisional director
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extent to which courts may influence or interfere with private business and,
equally important, about whether courts should be intricately involved at all
in the enforcement of ongoing, personal, consensual business relationships
that are fraught with friction.99 These questions implicate important policy
concerns, including shareholder autonomy rights, the authority of the courts,
and the tensions between public and private interests. The following Part
discusses these competing policy principles and their effect on one's norma-
tive view of the provisional director remedy.
I1. Fundamental Policy Principles and Interests
A. Shareholder Autonomy
As a primary matter, courts should not unduly interfere with the internal
affairs of corporations and have properly hesitated to do so even in cases of
deadlock.00 In the interests of private business and shareholder autonomy,
courts must respect the decisions that are made by close corporation sharehold-
ers pursuant to their inherent rights to vote and manage the business. The
fundamental voting rights of shareholders occupy a "sacred space" in corporate
governance.' In close corporations in particular, the shareholder's exercise
of "voice" through voting takes on greater significance because "exit" is not
easy.10 2 Shareholders possess the right to elect and remove directors and to
have a meaningful voice in the operation of the corporation."0 3 Any action
unjustifiably destroys the veto powers of the shareholders and has extended detrimental effects
on the shareholder who resists the appointment. Id. at 21-22.
99. Id. atl6.
100. See Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1386 (N.J. 1996) ("Traditionally,
American courts were reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of a corporation.").
101. Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on
the Board's Power to "Just Say No", 67 U. CQN. L. REV. 999, 1009 (1999).
102. Id. at 1015-16 (discussing political scientist Albert Hirshman's well-known theory
of voice and exit as alternative values). "A shareholder who has easy exit and liquidity by being
able to sell her shares may well pay little attention to voting." Id. at 1015. On the other hand,
if "exit is denied to an investor," either "because of the lack of a market or for other reasons ....
voice becomes much more important and the investor will pay attention to, and value more
highly, the shareholder franchise." Id. at 1016; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text
(noting absence of exit options for close corporation shareholders).
103. See 2 FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 283 (noting that shareholders have "inherent power
to appoint directors"). "In the absence of a compelling reason,. . . a court should not preclude
shareholders from the full exercise of this right." Id. (citing SEC v. Vesco, 571 F.2d 129 (2d
Cir. 1978)); see also Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1558-60 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (noting
"systematic effort to exclude [minority shareholder] from any meaningful role in the corpora-
tion" and ordering buy-out of minority shareholder's interest at fair value); Compton v. Paul K.
Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (I11. Ct  App. 1972) (finding that defendant's failure
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taken by the court to remedy corporate ills, including the appointment of a
provisional director, must accommodate these important shareholder interests.
If the provisional director remedy is constructed too broadly, the danger is that
it will unduly infringe on the autonomy rights of shareholders to elect whom
they want as directors and to exercise their right to veto certain managerial
decisions, even if it creates deadlock.
The presence of the provisional director arguably does not interfere with
shareholder voting rights that would otherwise be effective in the provisional
director's absence. These voting rights were fully exercised by the sharehold-
ers; their voices were simply rendered ineffective by the shareholders' own
actions. The appointment of a provisional director is not alone responsible for
the muting of shareholder voice. The shareholders themselves cancelled out
their own voices when they deadlocked. From this perspective, the court does
not take away the voting rights of shareholders when it appoints a provisional
director. Rather, the court is merely providing relief for shareholders who
exercised their voting powers but suffered a breakdown in corporate
decisionmaking by virtue of their own disagreement. In such cases, the court
has broad powers to order remedies to assist shareholders. However, the
breadth of these powers raises additional concerns about the extent of the
court's authority and ongoing involvement in corporate matters.
B. Court Authority and Involvement
Pursuant to their equitable powers, courts have extensive authority and
flexibility to fashion remedies for problems resulting from discord within
corporations. 4 However, when the court orders a remedy that requires the
to call board meetings or to consult with minority shareholder regarding management of
corporate affairs was sufficient "to justify the finding of oppression and the order of dissolu-
tion").
104. For example, many courts, invoking their inherent equitable powers, have ordered
buy-outs of a shareholder's interest in the absence of any specific statutory authority. See, e.g.,
Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230,236 (Mont. 1983) (affirming trial court's determination that
liquidation and dissolution were not justified by equities and stating that courts can adopt
flexible approaches); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-98 (Or.
1973) (concluding that courts have power to order any appropriate equitable relief and citing
list of several potential alternatives to dissolution); see also 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note
11, § 9.35 (listing fourteen examples of "court-fashioned remedies" available to resolve close
corporation disputes). Equitable remedies are powerful because they are so flexible, variable,
and adaptable to the circumstances. 1 JOHN N. PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 109
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1994). "[T]he court of equity has the power of devising its
remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex
relations of all the parties." Id. For a historical review of courts' willingness to use their
equitable powers to fashion remedies providing "complete relief' for shareholder disputes, see
Bahls, supra note 45, at 294-95.
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continuing involvement of the court itself, cause for concern may exist. As a
practical matter, courts should not become entangled in ongoing disputes over
business, rather than legal, issues." 5 Generally, it would be inappropriate for
the court to undertake, either directly or indirectly, the supervision of business
management. When this principle is applied to the provisional director rem-
edy, the scope of the remedy may be problematic. For example, if the provi-
sional director is required to provide regular reports to the court regarding the
status of the deadlock and the corporation's business, the remedy begins to take
on the characteristics of indirect court supervision of management.'
More fundamentally, the issue is whether the provisional director may be
viewed as an "officer of the court," serving at the direction and discretion of the
court. There is a sense in which the provisional director acts as an extension
of the judge who made the appointment. The remedy itself contemplates the
creation of a special directorial position with traits akin to a court-appointed
arbitrator or mediator who substitutes for, or provides assistance to, the judge
in resolving a dispute."0 7
However, the analogy has weaknesses because the judges themselves
would decline to make the very business decisions that the provisional director
is being appointed to make to break the corporate deadlock. The provisional
director renders business decisions for the parties in a way that courts would
not, due to their adherence to the principle of non-involvement in internal
corporate affairs. Nonetheless, the nature of the provisional director's position
seems to carry with it a connection to the court that suggests some type of
105. If, for example, the basis for the intra-corporate deadlock concerns disagreements over
business issues, such as whether to expand the business, or pursue a new product line, or
undertake a new round of financing, courts are not the appropriate forum to make such judg-
ments for the parties. Courts traditionally have been reluctant to wade into matters of business
judgment, and this in part has led to the development of judicial deference to managerial
business decisions under the business judgment rule. See BRANSON, supra note 27, § 7.05, at
339 (noting that "courts are ill-equipped to exhume and reexamine business decisions"); see
also I DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUsINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CoRPo-
RATE DIRECTORS 12-18 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing underlying rationales for judicial deference
to directors' business decisions).
106. Provisional director statutes in some states do have such reporting requirements. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(2) (West 2001) (requiring provisional director to "report from
time to time to the court concerning the matter complained of, or the status of the deadlock, if
any, and of the status of the corporation's business").
107. See MOSTEN, supra note 70, at 109-14 (discussing court-annexed mediation); Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-
AnnexedArbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169,2177-86 (1993) (discussing features
of court-annexed arbitration); see also supra Parts lI.B.2, I.B.3 (discussing aspects of arbitra-
tion and mediation).
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"officer of the court" relationship.' If the provisional director's presence
signifies the court's continuing jurisdiction over the dispute, the involvement
of the court may be more extensive than policy principles would normally
allow. Viewed in this manner, the provisional director remedy unavoidably
involves significant tension between competing policy interests. On the one
hand, it is desirable to provide courts with broad authority to fashion any type
of appropriate remedy to meet the specific needs of the parties. On the other
hand, principles ofjudicial restraint dictate that courts avoid extensive involve-
ment in the supervision of business affairs. Before any accommodation of
these competing concerns can be attempted, consideration must also be given
to the overarching public and private interests at stake.
C. Public Interest vs. Private Ordering
Concerns about the autonomy interests of shareholders and the extent of
court involvement in corporate affairs reflect a deeper tension between compet-
ing views of the corporation itself. Corporate conduct can be viewed as the
product of private ordering or as the subject of broader public interests." 9
Determining the appropriate scope ofjudicial remedies for corporate deadlock
depends on which perspective is taken. If corporate activity is defined in
purely private terms, then any dissension within the corporation should be seen
108. The concept suggests a "formal and continuing special relationship with access and
responsibilities to authority not possessed by, or due by, others." James A. Cohen, Lawyer
Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer of the Court", 48 BuFF. L. REv. 349,359
(2000). Under this view, an officer of the court acts in a "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-official"
capacity. Id. (quoting Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV.
39, 48 (1989)). Indeed, some courts have specifically found that provisional directors do
possess such status. E.g., Abreu v. Unica Indus. Sales, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991).
109. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201-02
(recognizing "public/private distinction" that "explicitly and implicitly structurfes] thought
about the nature of corporate activity"). Under the public model, "corporate activity has broad
social and political ramifications" that raise certain public interest concerns. Id. at 201. In
contrast, the focus of the private model is on the "private relations between the shareholders of
the corporation and management" and "deal[s] primarily with the governance problems that
arise inside the corporation." Id. at 201-02. The public-private distinction is part of a much
larger, ongoing debate over the fundamental nature and purpose of corporations. See Lawrence
E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The AL! Principles of Corporate Governance, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 871, 872, 877-80 (1993) (discussing contrasting public and private views
of nature of corporation and of corporate law). The debate over the public-private distinction
permeates a wide range of legal issues and is subject to varying degrees of analysis. See
generally Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). A
comprehensive discussion or resolution of the public-private debate in corporate law is beyond
the scope of this Article. The distinction is raised here only to inform the discussion of
important policies underlying the provisional director remedy.
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as merely a private spat between the parties. Courts should avoid substantial
or ongoing intervention and instead allow the market to order the parties'
conduct.1 If a broader public interest perspective is taken, severe deadlock
harms not only the owner of the corporation, but also all constituents who have
a stake in the corporation's success, including its employees, creditors, suppli-
ers, customers, and the surrounding community."' Under this view, courts
arguably have greater justification for quick intervention to minimize the
detrimental effects of deadlock, even if that intervention involves the deploy-
ment of the court's own officer to take a seat on the board and break the dead-
lock.
At times, corporate law has espoused a public-oriented view of corporate
activity, as corporations were often perceived to be created for the public
benefit." '2 Today, the law allows for a more private-oriented conception of the
corporation as a nexus of contractual arrangements between parties. Share-
holders are given wide discretion to make their own agreements, bargain for
appropriate provisions in articles of incorporation, and generally protect their
investments through private ordering mechanisms. 3 In the context of intra-
110. The "ideology of 'privatization' has deep roots in political and economic "laissez
faire" theory. See Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in
American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 225 & n.5 (1985) (discussing "laissez faire" theorists'
antagonism toward government interference with private sphere of economic activity).
111. This view of corporate activity values the harmonious relations of corporate partici-
pants because it contributes to higher productivity and ultimately to the public good. Leffler,
supra note 38, at 262. The concern for the public interest has prevented some courts from
exercising their discretion to dissolve corporations for fear of injuring the public. See, e.g.,
Struckhoffv. Echo Ridge Farm, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 463,466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that,
before ordering dissolution, courts "should consider the effect the dissolution would have on
the public as well as the shareholders"); see also Bahls, supra note 45, at 296-97 (noting that
courts that have been unwilling to dissolve corporations due to potential public harm presum-
ably worry about harm to "displaced employees, suppliers, and frequently, customers").
112. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1425 (1982) (noting that regulatory public law premises had dominated law of
corporations prior to 1819); see also JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGrTIMACY OF THE BUSMNESS
CORPORATION rN THE LAW OF TIE UNrrED STATES: 1780-1970, at 17-21 (1970) (discussing
special charters granted to early corporations serving public utility function); D. Gordon Smith,
The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 292-96 (1998) (discussing relationship
between early business corporations and public interest).
113. Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP.
L. 377, 378 (1990). The view that individuals should be given the freedom to strike their own
bargains and to structure their lives according to their own preferences is, in part, rooted in a
contractarian view of society. David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis
in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1382 (1993). It was recognized decades ago
that close corporation shareholders, in particular, need to have the freedom to enter into
shareholder agreements to protect their investments. Therefore, legislatures moved to enact
more enabling laws for close corporation participants to allow them to "make appropriate
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corporate discord, respect for private ordering and for the autonomy rights of
shareholders suggests that courts should defer to remedies that shareholders
themselves have chosen ex ante." 4 Moreover, courts should have nojurisdic-
tion to intervene unless the shareholders have first exhausted any non-judicial
remedies that exist in shareholder agreements.
Standing alone, this purely private, non-interventionist orientation is
somewhat extreme. It must be tempered with the recognition that law and
courts do play an important role in corporate governance. The law should
supplement private ordering, especially in the context of close corporations,
when it is difficult for shareholders to bargain ex ante for the appropriate
protections in agreements and articles."' The role of the court is essential in
providing remedies that keep people from resorting to extreme self-help
measures to resolve their disputes. The public court provides a forum for
individuals to be assured that their claims will be heard and that their expecta-
tions of justice will be fulfilled." 6  To some extent, judicial intervention in
arrangements to resolve... problems for themselves." JA.C. Hetherington, Special Charac-
teristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 5.
114. Private ordering may provide for any number of dispute resolution mechanisms. For
example, the parties may enter into an agreement to arbitrate any future intra-corporate disputes,
Thompson, supra note 113, at 384, 399, or to specify a particular person to cast the deciding
vote in case of future deadlock, e.g., Belfer v. Merling, 730 A.2d 434,438 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999), or to fashion their own private provisional director remedy by creating a special
class of stock with the power to elect a tie-breaking director, e.g, Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d
800, 807-08 (Del. 1966).
115. See Thompson, supra note 113, at 402 (arguing that, due to characteristics of close
corporations, private ordering should not necessarily always be starting point for resolving legal
issues). Close corporation shareholders do not and cannot always take advantage of private
ordering because "some aspects of the relationship do not lend themselves to advance planning."
Id. at 394. Preparing adequately for contingencies that are distant in time is very difficult,
especially if the contingency relates to the possible failure of the enterprise. Id. at 395. The
start of the business venture is marked by optimism, and parties may consciously or subcon-
sciously avoid contemplation of potential failure or irreconcilable disagreement. See Thomp-
son, supra note 1, at 224 ("Parties entering into a business relationship are not always willing
to fully explore the ramifications of possible disputes if things were to go wrong. A prolonged
focus on the 'downside' may seem inconsistent with the mutual trust on which the business
must depend."); see also Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held
Corporations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 65, 92-94 (1993) (discussing reasons why close corpora-
tion shareholders either fail to make contracts or make incomplete contracts to protect their
interests).
116. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution andPublic Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 985-86 (2000). Individuals have
a "broadly held expectation that legal disputes will be resolved in public courts of law." Id. at
985 (discussing Lawrence Friedman's conception of "general expectation of justice" (citing
Lawrence M. Friedman, TOTAL JUSTICE 76 (1985)). The court's role is central because it
assures individuals that their "claims of injustice will be heard, considered, and judged on their
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shareholder disputes is inevitable to resolve controversies because such in-
volvement is necessary for upholding greater flexibility in private ordering." 7
The judicial role is an important supplement to private ordering when advance
private ordering is inadequate." 8 As a fundamental policy concern, costs are
associated with judicial involvement in corporate governance, and courts
surely should avoid unduly interfering with private business. Nonetheless, if
the parties have come to court seeking relief, particularly in the form of the
provisional director remedy, they have at least implicitly made the choice to
forego other private dispute resolution mechanisms, such as private arbitrators
or mediators, and have looked to the court to appoint its own officer to help.
These principles highlight the public and private features of the provi-
sional director position itself. In some ways, the provisional director appears
to be simply a private, neutral third party whose only obligations are to the
parties who seek the provisional director's assistance. From a functional
standpoint, the provisional director acts much like a private arbitrator or
mediator who is contracted to help resolve the disputes of private parties. The
parties themselves pay for the provisional director's fees through corporate
funds." 9 Viewed in this light, the provisional director remedy may be classi-
fied with other private alternative dispute resolution methods.
However, the court's involvement in appointing the provisional director,
administering the remedy, supervising the provisional director's activity, and
merits." Albert W. Alsehuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Services
and the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808,1810 (1986).
"In the end, some rights are sensed as rights, not merely as economically efficient arrange-
merits." Id. at 1816.
117. See Christopher A. Riley, Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the
CompaniesAct 1985 and the Role of the Courts, 55 MoD. L. REv. 782,782-90 (1992) (discuss-
ing process and form of inter-shareholder contracting and inevitability of some judicial interfer-
ence in private contracting). Professor Coffee describes judicial oversight as an essential
element of private ordering: "Judicial activism is the necessary complement to contractual
freedom. In short, because such long-term relational contracting is necessarily incomplete, the
court's role becomes that of preventing one party from exercising powers delegated to it for the
mutual benefit of all shareholders for purely self-interested ends." John C. Coffee Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLuM.
L. REV. 1618, 1621 (1989).
118. Thompson, supra note 1, at 237. Particularly in the close corporation context, the
need for judicial monitoring is a corollary of the need for greater flexibility in contracting. John
C. Coffee Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the
Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919, 941 (1988). For long-term contracts,
"judicial involvement is not an aberration but an integral part of such contracting." Coffee,
supra note 117, at 1620.
119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(3) (West 2001) (providing for "reasonable
compensation to the provisional director for services rendered... which amounts shall be paid
by the corporation").
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finally ordering the dismissal of the provisional director, infuses this seemingly
private dispute resolution process with significant public elements. The court
lends its "power, prestige, and imprimatur to the results" of the process. 20 The
provisional director therefore combines public and private functions. It is, in
a sense, private resolution through public oversight. As will be discussed
below, this blending of roles has important implications for the impartiality and
expertise of the person who is chosen to be the provisional director. In addi-
tion, the amalgam of public and private interests is deeply significant when
issues of duty, liability, and immunity are concerned.
An appropriate construction of the provisional director remedy must
accommodate the fundamental policy principles involved. Statutes must
balance the autonomy rights of shareholders with the important public role of
courts in upholding and supplementing private ordering. When possible,
shareholder autonomy interests should be primary; courts and their agents
should keep their involvement to a minimum insofar as fairness and justice
require. 21 How to strike the proper balance between the competing public and
private policy principles is not easy. As the following Part indicates, state
provisional director statutes for the most part have been unable to find that
appropriate equilibrium and therefore have had a tendency to lean too far to
one side or another.
IV Critical Analysis of State Provisional Director Statutes
State provisional director statutes vary considerably in their approach.
The differences in treatment are rooted in contrasting views of the nature of the
remedy. The divergence is also a reflection of the underlying tension between
competing fundamental policy principles. Because several states have statutes
modeled after the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA-CC) provision, the analysis of existing
provisional director legislation will begin with an overview of the MBCA-CC
approach.
120. Reuben, supra note 116, at 1017 (referring to state's active participation in court-
related and contractual alternative dispute resolution processes). Strictly private forms of
dispute resolution do not carry the same "governmental imprimatur." Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
& Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 42, 57
(1988). Professor Reuben argues that the significant, central, and indispensable role of
government in developing and administering certain modes of private alternative dispute
resolution absorbs these modes into the broader public justice system. Reuben, supra note 116,
at 989-1017; Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory ofAlternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 590 (1997). In analyzing private dispute resolution
mechanisms, a sense in which the fulfillment of private interests can ultimately serve the public
interest exists. Kanowitz, supra note 63, at 241,255-57.
121. Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).
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A. Model Business Corporation Act
The MBCA-CC and state statutes that are patterned after it apply only to
corporations that affirmatively elect statutory close corporation status.
Because only a small percentage of corporations formally make this type of
election,'23 the statute's reach is limited. The MBCA-CC authorizes courts to
appoint provisional directors in situations involving corporate deadlock.'24
More specifically, under Section 41 (a)(7), the court may order "the appoint-
ment of a provisional director (who has all the rights, powers, and duties of a
duly elected director) to serve for the term and under the conditions prescribed
by the court."'25 The statute does not provide specific guidelines for the
implementation of the provisional director remedy other than to state that the
court can set the term and conditions of the appointment. The absence of
detailed standards is purposeful; the objective is to prevent undue restriction
on courts' discretion in applying remedies.' 26 The statute therefore gives courts
extensive authority to define the scope of the provisional director remedy as
broadly as they desire, arguably upholding a more public-oriented view of the
remedy. The MBCA-CC provision has been adopted in various states without
significant revision, including Georgia, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.'2
122. See MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 3(a) ("A statutory close corporation is a corporation
whose articles of incorporation contain a statement that the corporation is a statutory close
corporation.").
123. See I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, § 1.19 (noting that probably 5% or less
of corporations eligible for statutory close corporation status elect such status in states with such
statutes).
124. ' Deadlock is only one of three grounds that can trigger relief under the statute. More
specifically, statutory relief is available in any of the following situations: (1) the directors or
those controlling the corporation are acting illegally, oppressively, fraudulently, or with unfair
prejudice to the petitioner; (2) the directors are deadlocked, resulting in irreparable injury to the
corporation or the inability to conduct the business to the advantage of the shareholders
generally; or (3) grounds for judicial dissolution exist under the general dissolution statute.
MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 40. MBCA section 14.30 provides for judicial dissolution upon
the first two grounds as well as upon the misapplication of assets and shareholder deadlock that
prevents the election of directors for two years. MBCA, supra note 52, § 14.30. Thus, the
provisional director remedy in the MBCA-CC is tied to the dissolution provisions in a way that
is intended to avoid dissolution if possible.
125. MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 41(aX7). The appointment of a provisional director is
only one of several forms of ordinary relief under the MBCA-CC. Other forms of relief include
the appointment or removal from office of any director or officer, the appointment of a custo-
dian, the payment of dividends, or the award of damages to any party. Id. § 41(a).
126. Id. § 41, Official Cmt.
127. See GA. CoDE ANN. § 14-2-941(a)(7) (1994) (adopting provision verbatim); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 351.855(7) (West 2001) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(1)(g) (1999)
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Other states have fashioned their own unique provisional director statutes
that set forth the parameters of the remedy in greater detail. The following
subpart analyzes the different approaches taken by these state statutes with
respect to each aspect of the provisional director remedy. The analysis and
conclusions drawn from the following discussion will serve as the basis for the
proposed model provisional director statute set forth in Part V.
B. Parameters of the Provisional Director Remedy in State Legislation
1. Role of the Provisional Director
a. Rights and Powers
Statutes vary in defining the precise scope of the provisional director's
powers. Several states endow the provisional director with all the same "rights,
powers, and duties of a duly elected director." '28 On its face, the grant of power
seems quite broad because the provisional director possesses rights identical
to those of all other directors. The statute treats provisional directors as if
parties had elected them directly. However, this broad language is immediately
limited by the caveat that the provisional director "serve[s] for the term and
under the conditions prescribed by the court.1 129 Thus, the court retains the
authority to circumscribe specifically the role that the provisional director is
to play in each case.
Other states are much more explicit about the court's authority to define
the scope of the provisional director remedy. Illinois, for example, conspicu-
ously omits the reference to the same rights and powers of duly elected direc-
tors and instead allows provisional directors to serve only "for the term and
under the conditions prescribed by the court." 3° However, many states do not
(same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (adopting substantially similar
provision); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2)(aX7) (West 2002) (adopting provision verbatim);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(a)(vii) (Michie 2001) (same).
128. GA. CODEANN. § 14-2-941(a)(7) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.855(7) (West 2001);
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(1)(g) (2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2)(a)(7) (West 2002);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(aXvii) (Michie 2001); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-
410(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (granting provisional director "rights, powers, and duties of an
elected director").
129. GA. CODEANN. § 14-2-941 (a)(7) (1994); Mo.ANN. STAT. § 351.855(7) (West 2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(1)(g) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410(a)(7) (Law. Co-op.
1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2Xa)(7) (West 1992); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-
141 (a)(vii) (Michie 2001).
130. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(bX7) (West Supp. 2002). The Maine statute is
even more specific. It provides for an "additional director" to be appointed to act "in those
matters the court directs, and to hold office as a director for any period the court orders, but not
longer than 2 years." M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434(2)(E) (West 2002).
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include a reference to the court's powers to define the provisional director's
role. Rather, the statutes provide that the provisional director has "all the rights
and powers of a duly elected director," including the right to notice of and to
vote at meetings of directors until the provisional director is removed.' 3
Statutes that equate the rights and powers of provisional directors with
those of duly elected directors seem to misconceive the purpose of the provi-
sional director remedy. The ultimate role of the provisional director is a
limited one: to cast tie-breaking votes to end deadlocks between conflicting
factions.'32 The court appoints the provisional director as an extension of the
court to act in some capacity as a mediator for the warring parties, but ulti-
mately as a final arbitrator or decisionmaker on issues that cannot be resolved
by the parties themselves. To assert that provisional directors have all the same
rights and powers as full-fledged board members is improper because provi-
sional directors cannot themselves initiate actions or bind the company in the
same way that elected directors can.
For example, suppose that the reason for a deadlock is that two equally
divided shareholders who are acting as directors wish to expand the company's
operations into new product lines. One shareholder prefers product line A
while the other prefers product line B. If, in the provisional director's judg-
ment, product line C would actually be the most advantageous option for the
company, the provisional director might make that suggestion in the board
meeting to facilitate a compromise among the factions. However, the provi-
sional director should not have the same right as a true director to reject the
proposals of the two shareholders and thus halt altogether any expansion by
refusing to create a majority decision. Like arbitrators, provisional directors
"are not original formulators of policy."' 33 The role of the provisional director
131. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(c) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(c) (Supp. 1998);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(c) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(1) (West 2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(c) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(2) (West Supp. 2002); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 78A.150(3)(c) (Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp.
2002); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(d) (West 1995); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
12.53(BX2) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Alaska, California, and Ohio provide simply that the
provisional director possesses the same rights and powers as a director. ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.640(b) (Michie 2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 308(c) (West Supp. 2002); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.9113(B) (West 1994).
132. In re Annrhon, Inc., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Latt v. Superior
Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); cf Bosworth v. Ehrenreich, 823 F. Supp.
1175, 1182 (D.N.J. 1993) (ordering that provisional director be allowed to cast two votes to
break ties when provisional director was added to three-member board).
133. O'Neal, supra note 48, at 792. Provisional directors are similar to arbitrators in that
they "do not make decisions ab initio or on their own motion." Id.; see also Thompson, supra
note 1, at 229 (noting that provisional directors cannot act on their own and can only combine
with other directors to create majority vote that is needed for corporate action). Interestingly,
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should be to vote with one side to break the deadlock even if, had the provi-
sional director been an ordinary director of the company, the provisional
director would have voted to veto the ideas of the other two shareholders based
on an honest belief as to what would be most advantageous for the company.
Therefore, the rights and powers of a provisional director are limited to
making tie-breaking decisions in the provisional director's discretion. Unlike
custodians, provisional directors are not empowered to make unilateral deci-
sions to maintain the operations of the business. This is not to say that provi-
sional directors vote only on minor matters. The fact that their role involves
voting with one side to break ties does not mean that the tie-breaking vote
cannot concern matters of enormous significance. The provisional director's
decisions may quite properly effect major structural changes within the com-
pany.
134
Statutes granting provisional directors the same rights and powers as duly
elected directors are problematic because they imply that provisional directors,
like ordinary directors, are entitled to vote on any and all board matters.
However, the parties may wish to specify which issues in particular require the
provisional director's vote. All other matters may remain within the domain
of the parties and need not be considered by the provisional director at all.
A pair of contrasting cases illustrates this issue. The cases involved the
scope of the provisional director's authority to vote on certain matters. In In
reAnnrhon,'" a court appointed a provisional director for a corporation whose
shareholders were divided into two equal factions. The shareholders, as
two states, California and New Jersey, allow for the appointment of more than one provisional
director. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 308(b) (West Supp. 2002) (providing for appointment of "a
provisional director or directors"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp. 2002) (provid-
ing for "one or more provisional directors"). The statutes do not clarify whether two or more
different provisional directors may serve simultaneously or whether the authorization is for
consecutive appointments.
134. For example, in In re Jamison Steel Corp., 322 P.2d 246 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958),
the provisional director had the authority to vote for an amendment to the company's articles
of incorporation. Id. at 253; see also In re Calvert, 135 B.R. 398 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991)
(appointing provisional director for corporation whose two 50% shareholders had disagreements
as directors of company). The effects of the provisional director's actions in Calvert were
dramatic: at a special board meeting, the provisional director voted with one shareholder to
issue additional shares of stock to that shareholder in satisfaction of a debt owed to the share-
holder by the corporation. Id. at 399. The net effect of the equity-for-debt exchange was to
increase that shareholder's percentage of ownership of the company, thereby making him a
majority shareholder. Id. The shareholder then petitioned "for removal of the provisional
director on the ground that a provisional director was no longer necessary since [he] was now
the majority shareholder and the basis of the stalemate no longer existed." Id. The provisional
director's vote therefore effected a complete change in the ownership structure of the company.
135. Annrhon, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
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directors, were deadlocked on several issues, including whether to expand the
business or, in the alternative, to sell it. 3 ' Although one faction wanted the
court to specify the deadlocked issues on which the provisional director could
vote, the court held that the provisional director had the powers of a director to
vote on all matters, making it unnecessary for the court to "list[] the issues
upon which the provisional director could vote."' 37 In contrast, the court in
Abreu v. Unica Industrial Sales'38 found that the provisional director, as an
officer of the court, served "at the discretion and direction of the court" and
could be instructed by the court to vote only upon certain matters.'3 9 The
differing results in Annrhon and Abreu reflect the tension between different
visions of the provisional director remedy and the underlying policy interests.
Is the provisional director an officer of the court or a part of the corporation's
leadership team like other directors? Are the provisional director's primary
obligations to the court or to the shareholders and the corporation's best
interests?
The answer seems to lie somewhere in between: provisional directors
combine both public and private functions, and therefore a balancing of inter-
ests is required. If the parties had submitted their dispute to a private mediator-
arbitrator, that person would have been authorized to decide only those issues
that the parties chose to submit to the mediation-arbitration process. The
provisional director acts in a similar capacity, but is also a public court ap-
pointee. The court must reserve some power to define the scope of the provi-
sional director's role in each case. However, the provisional director needs
sufficient freedom to exercise discretion similar to that of an ordinary director
in making decisions that are in the best interests of the company. To accommo-
date all of these dynamics, the best approach is to start with the assumption that
provisional directors have the authority to vote on all deadlocked matters,
unless parties specifically ask the court to restrict the issues on which the
provisional director may vote. At the time of the appointment, the court can
instruct the provisional director to vote on a specific set of matters and autho-
rize the provisional director to vote on other issues as they arise if the parties
desire. This approach would avoid undue interference with private business
136. Id. at 605.
137. Id. at 606. A separate issue in Annrhon was whether a shareholder's agreement
shifted the powers of the board to the shareholders such that "a provisional director cannot vote
on any of the disputed issues because they are matters completely within the power and control
of the shareholders." Id. The court found that "the shareholder's agreement did not entirely
divest the board of all powers" over the company, and therefore the provisional director had the
power to vote on disputed issues involving the ultimate direction of the company. Id. at 607.
138. Abreu v. Unica Indus. Sales, 586 N.E.2d 661 (I1. App. Ct. 1991).
139. Id. at 667.
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and uphold the autonomy rights of the parties while preserving the public
functions of the provisional director remedy.
Because statutes that define provisional directors' rights and powers as
identical to those of "duly elected directors" are misleading, a better approach
would be to clarify that provisional directors have the rights and powers to vote
as directors on all issues, unless otherwise requested by the parties and pre-
scribed by the court. 40 These clarifications would reflect the fact that, as court
appointees, provisional directors are not quite the same as ordinary directors
and should not be treated the same way.
b. Duties
Similar concerns arise when examining the duties and responsibilities of
the provisional director. Statutes that follow the MBCA-CC approach provide
that a provisional director carries the same "duties of a duly elected direc-
tor."' 1 Many other states, while granting provisional directors the same "rights
and powers" as ordinary directors, lack any reference to similar duties.'42 Two
states, Florida and New Jersey, add that provisional directors have the duty to
report periodically to the court on the status of the deadlock and the corpora-
tion's business.143 Provisional directors in these states also submit recommen-
dations to the court, when so directed, as to the appropriate disposition of the
action. 
1 44
Statutes that say provisional directors have the same "duties of a duly
elected director" leave unanswered the question whether provisional directors
in fact have the same fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders
that ordinary directors have. A fundamental tenet of corporate law is that
140. See infra Part V.A (proposing model statute).
141. GA. CODEANN. § 14-2-941 (a)(7) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.855(7) (West 2001);
MONT. CODEANN. § 35-9-502(l)(g) (2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2Xa)(7) (West 1992);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(a)(vii) (Michie 2001); MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 41(a)(7).
142. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(c) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(c) (Supp. 1998);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(c) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(1) (West 2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(c) (West 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(2) (West Supp. 2001); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. 78A.150(3Xc) (Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp.
2002); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(d) (West 1995); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
12.53(B)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Alaska, California, and Ohio provide simply that the
provisional director possesses the same rights and powers as a director. ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.640(b) (Michie 2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 308(c) (West Supp. 2001); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.911(B) (West 1994).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(2) (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(6) (West
Supp. 2002).
144. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(2) (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(6) (West
Supp. 2002).
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directors are subject to fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in exercising their
powers on behalf of the corporation. 4 These duties require that a director act
in good faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation.'46 In close corporations, where shareholders
usually act as directors and managers of the corporation, courts are particularly
prone to impose heightened fiduciary duties of the utmost good faith and fair
dealing.'47 Any breach of these fiduciary duties can result in the offending
director's personal liability for the harms caused by the breach. 4  Whether
provisional directors can or should be subject to the same directorial fiduciary
duties as ordinary directors presents a difficult question.
On the one hand, if provisional directors are to be treated for all intents
and purposes as duly elected directors, they should not only be granted the
same rights and powers, but also be subject to the same duties and responsibili-
ties. The possibility always exists that provisional directors, like ordinary
directors, may abuse their decisionmaking powers and their position of author-
ity in a manner that harms the corporation. For example, provisional directors
might engage in various forms of self-dealing, including the appropriation of
certain corporate opportunities or the failure to disclose conflicts of interest
when the board votes to approve a proposed transaction. In order to discourage
such conduct, provisional directors arguably should be held to the same fidu-
ciary standards of good faith and fair dealing as ordinary directors.'49
145. See Cox ET AL., supra note 23, at 179-217 (discussing directors' fiduciary duties);
1 Wnjn~m E. KNEPPER& DANA. BAiJJY,LL ABnTY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS,
§§ 1-7, 3-1-4-24 (6th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001) (noting directors' role as fiduciaries and
explaining their duties of loyalty and diligence).
146. See, e.g., MBCA, supra note 52, § 8.30 (stating standards of conduct for corporate
directors).
147. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass.
1976) (noting that close corporation stockholders, like partners in partnership, owe one another
duty of good faith and loyalty); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass.
1975) (holding that stockholders in close corporation owe each other substantially same
fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty that partners owe one another).
148. See I KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 145, §§ 3-16, 3-17, at 111-13 (discussing
liability of directors and officers for damages resulting from their own misconduct); see also
PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABIIT=Y 213-18 (1995) (discussing unique duties
and liabilities of close corporation directors).
149. See Rosenbaum, supra note 93, at 543 (discussing reasons for holding provisional
director to fiduciary duties of ordinary director). A recent case in the receivership context held
that corporate receivers are subject to fiduciary duties of loyalty to the corporation and, like
directors and officers, are liable for acquiring corporate opportunities in violation of that duty.
Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. Med. Benefit Adm'rs., LLC, 626 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
The court found that receivers are fiduciaries to all parties with an interest in the receivership
estate. Id. at 343-44; see also Shannon v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (noting that receivers, as fiduciaries, are not immune from liability for failing to
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Provisional directors can always avail themselves of the same mechanisms
that ordinary directors use to protect themselves from liability for fiduciary
breaches. In particular, if the corporation's articles include indemnification
provisions for the directors, or provisions eliminating or limiting personal
liability of directors for breaches of their duties, then these protections might
be construed to apply to provisional directors as well.5 Indeed, at least one
court has found that, in the custodial context, a custodian appointed to continue
the business of a corporation is not personally liable for negligent loss of
corporate assets because the custodian enjoys the same protection from liabil-
ity as any other director or officer.1 ' Although custodians assume greater
corporate control than provisional directors, sufficient analogies might be
drawn to argue that provisional directors, like custodians, "step into the shoes
of the... directors of the corporation" for purposes of personal liability.'
On the other hand, if provisional directors are charged with the same
fiduciary duties as duly elected directors, these duties may create disincentives
for individuals to serve as provisional directors. In the context of making tie-
carry out their duties properly); 16 FLETCBER, supra note 6, § 7811 (discussing fiduciary
capacity of receivers). Of course, the appointment of a receiver who takes control over the
corporation is a much more drastic step than appointing a provisional director and, therefore,
courts may more easily justify imposing fiduciary duties on receivers.
150. Statutes in all states now have provisions permitting or requiring indemnification of
corporate directors and officers for their expenses in defending against claims that allege
breaches of their duties. 2 KNEPPER & BAIRY, supra note 145, § 22-2 (noting that statutory
indemnification legislation has been enacted in all fifty states). The objective of such statutes
is to encourage qualified individuals to serve as directors and officers by providing them with
sufficient financial protection in case they are sued for their conduct. See VonFeldt v. Stifel
Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998) (describing indemnification statute as serving dual
purpose of "allowing corporate officials to resist unjustified lawsuits" and "encouraging capable
[professionals] to serve as corporate directors and officers" by requiring corporation to bear
"costs of defending their honesty and integrity"). Many states also have legislation authorizing
corporations to include charter provisions that eliminate or limit the personal liability of
directors for monetary damages for breaches of their duties. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra
note 145, app. B (listing state statutes that limit director liability).
151. Valley View State Bank v. Owen, 737 P.2d 35, 39-40 (Kan. 1987). In Owen, a prior
court had appointed a custodian due to irreconcilable conflicts between two equal shareholders
of a corporation. Id. at 37. The narrow holding of the Owen court addressed the issue of the
standing of creditors, rather than shareholders, to sue custodians for negligence. Id. at 39. The
court held that the custodian assumes the management function ordinarily performed by the
officers and directors, but the court did not specifically state that custodians would owe the
same fiduciary duties that directors and officers owe to the corporation and its shareholders.
Id. at 40. See generally Thomas 0. Fischer, Annotation, Liability of Corporate Custodian for
Negligence in Dealing with Affairs or Assets of Corporation, 74 A.L.R. 4th 770 (1989)
(discussing cases in which courts have analyzed whether personal liability can be imposed -upon
corporate custodians for failure to manage corporation properly).
152. Owen, 737 P.2d at 40.
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breaking decisions, one winner and one loser will always be found, and the
losing party may want to blame the provisional director. More specifically, the
risk always exists that losing parties will bring suits against provisional direc-
tors alleging breaches of fiduciary duties in making decisions that favor the
other side. Individuals who are contemplating service as provisional directors
may be unwilling to accept the appointment even with strong indemnification
protections because the benefits are simply not worth the risk of becoming
entangled in litigation."5 3 After all, individuals who agree to serve as provi-
sional directors are simply temporary additions to the board and are not expect-
ing that their limited role as mediating, tie-breaking decisionmakers will
suddenly transform them into fiduciaries of a company. In the close corpora-
tion context, unlike the other shareholder-directors of the company who likely
have invested considerable time, energy, and money into the business and who
regard each other as partners, the provisional director has no similar relation-
ship with the company or with its participants. To hold the provisional director
to the same fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty seems incongruous
with the purposes of the remedy and the nature of fiduciary law.
One way of viewing fiduciary relationships is to conceive of them as a
form of "entrusting" wherein one party entrusts itself to another to act on its
behalf and in its best interests.15 As the beneficiary of the relationship, the
entrustor is dependent on the fiduciary who acts as a type of substitute for the
entrustor and has the power to affect the entrustor's property or welfare. 15 5
Fiduciaries are entrusted with power to perform their functions. This power
153. Harold D. Field Jr., Resolving Shareholder Disputes and Breaking Deadlocks in the
Close Corporation, 58 MINN. L. REV. 985, 1006 (1974); Haynsworth, supra note 51, at 27.
154. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 & n.17 (1983). The
doctrine of fiduciary duty is extraordinarily complex, and an extended discussion of its parame-
ters is beyond the scope of this Article. The brief description of the "entrusting" element in
fiduciary relationships is intended to provide only some context for analyzing the question of
whether fiduciary duties should be imposed on provisional directors. For a more extensive
overview of fiduciary law, see 2A AusTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WnLIAM FRANKuNFRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170-85 (4th ed. 1987); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARMS
(1981); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879.
155. DeMott, supra note 154, at 912; Frankel, supra note 154, at 808; see also Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675,
1682-88 (1990) (discussing fiduciary relationship as one of power and dependency). The
relationship is "founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and
fidelity of another." Alpert v. Shafer, No. 89 Civ. 0839, 1991 WL 222130, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
24, 1991); see also Williams v. Griffin, 192 N.W.2d 283, 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) ("Such a
relationship exists when there is a reposing of faith, confidence, and trust, and the placing of
reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of another."). Professor Chaykin refers to this
aspect of fiduciary duty as the "principle of justifiable trust." Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator
Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 731,744 (1984).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 111 (2003)
carries with it the risk that the fiduciaries will misuse their power and injure the
entrustor.'5 6 Strict standards of care and loyalty are thus placed on fiduciaries
to ensure that they will act to benefit, rather than harm, the beneficiaries of the
relationship.'57
Applying these concepts to the provisional director context proves to be
an uneasy fit. Although provisional directors are vested with the power to
make tie-breaking decisions for disputing corporate parties, they do not act as
substitutes for the parties or for the benefit of the parties in the typical fiduciary
way. In assuming a mediating or arbitrating function on behalf of the parties,
the provisional director does not acquire the same type of trust or power that
would normally give rise to a fiduciary relationship. If, for example, the parties
had simply submitted their dispute to private arbitration, they would entrust the
final outcome to the arbitrator's judgment, but that entrustment would not then
transform the arbitrator into a fiduciary. The arbitrator would surely have a
duty to be fair, impartial, and free of conflicts or bias, and any decision made
in violation of that duty would be subject to attack.58 However, the arbitration
process by itself would not impose on the arbitrator fiduciary duties to the
parties. The same would be true if the parties chose to litigate their case in
court. To say that they entrust themselves and their resources to the judge to
make a decision on their behalf is not the same as saying that the judge then
owes them or the corporation fiduciary duties.' 9 If provisional directors'
functions are comparable to mediators or arbitrators, or if provisional directors
serve as substitutes for the judge as officers of the court, then the imposition
of fiduciary obligations would be inappropriate. The fact that the provisional
director acts similarly to a director in voting at board meetings does not neces-
sarily mean that the provisional director should be subject to the same fiduciary
duties as duly elected directors.
156. Frankel, supra note 154, at 809.
157. The fiduciary obligation therefore places significant burdens on the fiduciary. "The
fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the
beneficiary's best interests... [and] avoid acts that put his interests in conflict with the benefi-
ciary's." DeMott, supra note 154, at 882; see also Johnson, supra note 22, at 3-4 (noting that
relationship between director and corporation is directly analogous to that between trustee and
beneficiary and that, accordingly, director may not acquire interests in conflict with beneficiary).
158. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000) (providing for vacatur of arbitration awards resulting
from corruption, fraud, undue means, misconduct, or evident partiality on part of arbitrator).
159. Judges do exert significant power over the rights and interests of parties. "Adjudica-
tion .. .differs from ordinary decisionmaking in entrusting a choice to a person who is not
affected by it, a person who has special obligations to those whose interests are at stake."
Alschuler, supra note 116, at 1844. These "special obligations" may include duties of "fairness,
respect, and courtesy," but they most likely would not be defined as fiduciary duties to the
parties. Id.
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Conclusions drawn from any analysis of the duties and liabilities of
provisional directors will depend on whether the remedy is viewed in private
or public terms. The former perspective suggests that provisional directors and
parties may simply contract for how much liability or responsibility the provi-
sional director will undertake. The provisional director can bargain for indem-
nification or insurance that will provide protection for breaches of any duties
that are assumed at the outset of the appointment. 60 If the provisional director
instead is seen in more public terms as an officer of the court, intimately tied
to the public court as an extension of, or substitute for, the judge responsible
for the appointment, then arguably the provisional director should enjoy the
same immunities from liability that are afforded judges in their decisionmaking
capacity. When provisional directors provide periodic reports and recommen-
dations to the court as to the status and disposition of the matter, they perform
functions that seem acutely judicial in nature. If the rights and powers of
provisional directors are not as extensive as those of duly elected directors,
then provisional directors' duties and liabilities correspondingly should not be
as far-reaching. As will be discussed later, the model provisional director
statute proposed in this Article adopts this approach.'6"
Very few states include any reference in their provisional director legisla-
tion to the scope of provisional directors' liabilities for their decisions. 62
Those statutes that do refer to provisional directors' duties equate them with
those of duly elected directors, a problematic approach, as the foregoing
discussion suggests. A better solution would be to include specific reference
to the duties of provisional directors to vote to break ties in the best interests
of the corporation. Moreover, the ideal statute would include a clear indication
as to the extent of liability that provisional directors can expect to have for their
actions. The current variance in the statutory treatment of provisional direc-
160. In one case involving a custodian for a deadlocked corporation, one of the parties in
fact suggested providing the custodian with contractual protections from liability for the
business decisions he would make in breaking the deadlocks. See Marciano v. Nakash, 1986
WL 4002, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1986). The court approved a procedure that would serve as
an alternative to liability insurance. After each deadlock-breaking vote by the custodian, a ten-
day period would follow during which the losing party could appeal the custodian's decision
in court. Id. at *2. If no appeal were made within that time frame, the parties would be barred
from bringing any suit against the custodian arising from the vote. Id. The court noted that,
without such protective procedures, few if any custodians would be willing to serve. Id. at *3.
161. See infra Part V.A (proposing model statute).
162. Florida appears to be the only state that specifically defines the extent of provisional
directors' liability for their actions. It provides: "No provisional director shall be liable for any
action taken or decision made, except as directors may be liable under § 607.0831. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.1435(2) (West 2001). Section 607.0831 exempts ordinary directors from liability
for monetary damages for their actions as directors. Id. § 607.0831. Thus, the Florida statute
equates provisional directors' liabilities with those of ordinary directors.
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tors' duties and the lack of clear guidelines in any of the statutes impair the
ability of courts and their appointees to know exactly what duties and liabilities
attach in any one case.
2. Impartiality and Qualifications of the Provisional Director
The effectiveness of the provisional director remedy depends in large part
on the impartiality and neutrality of the provisional director. One would
expect that statutes in all states would set forth a clear impartiality require-
ment for any person who is appointed to serve as a provisional director.
However, states vary considerably in their standards for impartiality. Some
states require the provisional director to be an impartial person, who is neither
a shareholder nor a creditor of the corporation, nor related even "within the
third-degree" to any of the other directors of the corporation or to the judge
making the appointment.'63 In contrast, states that follow the MBCA-CC
approach do not mention impartiality requirements at all."6
Statutes that fail to provide explicitly for the impartiality of provisional
directors are fundamentally deficient. Without clear statutory standards of
impartiality, courts might appoint provisional directors who have affiliations
with shareholders of the company, thereby defeating the goal of having a tie-
breaking decisionmaker who is completely neutral. Abreu v. Unica Industrial
Sales provides a good example. 6 ' Plaintiff and defendant shareholders were
divided into two hostile factions."6 The trial court appointed a provisional
director for the corporation, but because the Illinois statute did not explicitly
require that the provisional director be an impartial person, the court ap-
pointed the plaintiff shareholder's son-in-law as the provisional director.'67
He had worked for the company for several years and held the title of General
163. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.640(b) (Michie 2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 308(c) (West Supp.
2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(2) (West Supp. 2001). The prohibition on appointments of
provisional directors who are related in the third-degree by blood or marriage to any other
director of the corporation or to the appointing judge is a high standard of impartiality that
mirrors the standard found in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(d) (2000). Third-degree relations include "great-grandparent,
grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew or
niece." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TERMINOLOGY (2000).
164. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-941(a)(7) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.855(7) (West 2001);
MONT. CODEANN. § 35-9-502 (1999); S.C. CODEANN. § 33-18-410(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1990);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(2XaX7) (West 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-141(a)(vii)
(Michie 2001); MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 41(a)(7).
165. Abreu v. Unica Indus. Sales, 586 N.E.2d 661,661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
166. Id. at 664.
167. Id. at 665.
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Manager of Operations. 6" After his appointment, he made a number of'
decisions that seemed to favor the plaintiff, his mother-in-law. 69 The appel-
late court subsequently reversed some of his decisions, finding them to be
inconsistent with the duties of a provisional director. 7' The court nonetheless
upheld his appointment as the provisional director in spite of the defendant's
assertion of bias.17' Observing that the provisional director statute lacked any
reference to impartiality, the court concluded that the statute gave the court
the discretion to appoint persons who lacked traditional impartiality if the
circumstances necessitated such an action. In particular, if the court deter-
mined that no independent third party had the skills and knowledge necessary
to fill the position on an immediate basis, then the court could appoint a
provisional director without regard to whether "that person ha[d] been aligned
or appear[ed] to have been aligned with a particular group of shareholders."' 72
Because the plaintiff's son-in-law was already familiar with the business and
the dissension between the parties, the court felt it could properly appoint him
to the provisional director position.173
The problem with this reasoning is that it will likely result in the appoint-
ment of a partial person in most cases. Third-party strangers to the corpora-
tion will almost always lack the intimate knowledge of the corporation and its
participants possessed by insiders. If a current employee or family member
168. Id. at 664-66.
169. For example, the provisional director voted in favor of reimbursing the plaintiff for
attorneys' fees and costs at trial and on appeal, even though the defendant's director asked that
the vote be postponed until he could consider the issue further. Id. at 666. The provisional
director allegedly acted in ways that were unfair to the defendant faction; the defendant
contended that the provisional director failed to provide the defendant's director with an agenda
for a meeting until the start of the meeting. Id. at 667.
170. The court invalidated the board's vote to reimburse the plaintiff for attorneys' fees and
costs, finding that the provisional director and the plaintiff improperly voted without giving the
defendant director the opportunity to review the issue thoroughly before making a decision. Id.
at 667-68.
171. The defendant argued that the provisional director was "merely a parrot or hand-
maiden of plaintiff, voting with plaintiff on matters simply because he is her son-in-law." Id.
at 665-66. The defendant claimed that "there was no such thing as an impartial son-in-law."
Id. at 665.
172. Id. Resisting the imposition of a strict requirement of impartiality, the court observed
that it would be difficult in this "crisis situation" to "find and appoint a traditionally impartial
independent third party, and allow that person time to familiarize himself with the history and
goals of the company." Id. In such situations, it might be preferable and in the best interests
of the corporation simply to appoint "competent people who may not be traditionally impartial,"
but who are available to serve. Id.
173. Id. The court found that impartiality was only one of many factors it could consider
in evaluating candidates for the provisional director position. Id.
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who has such familiarity with the business is available, the tendency will
always be to select that person to serve as the provisional director, rather than
a completely independent outside third party. The court's disregard for
whether the person may have been aligned with one of the warring factions in
the corporation ignores the mission of the provisional director remedy to
provide a neutral mediator-arbitrator in cases of corporate deadlock. Although
the insider may have special and detailed knowledge of the company, the
insider need not be given provisional director status to make use of such
knowledge. A provisional director who is an outside third party can always
invite insiders to attend board meetings and voice their opinions before the
provisional director casts a vote on any issue."' The result in Abreu seems to
neglect this point and therefore underscores the need to include clear impar-
tiality requirements in provisional director statutes.
The impartiality of the decisionmaker is an essential feature of the
provisional director remedy because it supports the parties' confidence in the
outcome and their perception of having been treated fairly.17 The closeness
of certain family or business relationships tends to suggest partiality.176 If the
provisional director is seen as an officer of the court or a delegate of judicial
power, the provisional director should have the same level of impartiality as
the judge."' If the provisional director is compared to a private mediator or
174. Professor Langevoort makes a similar point in the context of composing a corporate
board balanced with both inside and outside directors. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences oflndependence
andAccountability, 90 GEo. L.J. 797,800,806 (2001) (noting that insider participation in board
deliberations may be allowed on regular and invited basis).
175. See Silver, supra note 68, at 49 ("Impartiality ensures that a [third party's] actions will
be based upon the merits of the dispute rather than the personal influence or identity of the
disputants."). In the alternative dispute resolution context, surveys have indicated that people
are concerned about the personal biases of arbitrators and mediators. See Richard C. Reuben,
The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.BA. J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 58 (noting that 70% of respondents
expressed that concern).
176. In these relationships, the closeness of the tie may be demonstrative of partiality even
if the court does not consider allegations or proof of actual bias. See, e.g., Morelite Constr.
Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that father-son relationship between arbitrator and officer of union, to which party to
arbitration belonged, rose to level of "evident partiality" to justify vacating arbitration award);
see also Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1992) (noting
appearance of bias toward family members, friends, or business associates).
177. Statutes and ethics codes mandate strict judicial impartiality and it is an essential
constitutional value. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 605, 605 (1996). Judges must be disqualified from proceedings in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000) (discussing
disqualification of judges); Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When
THE PROVISIONAL DIRECTOR REMEDY
arbitrator, impartiality and neutrality are integral features of the dispute
resolution process, especially in situations in which the issues are likely to be
highly emotionally charged. 7' A neutral third party who is unaffiliated with
either of the contending factions is best able to make objective judgments.
Provisional director statutes should therefore incorporate explicit inpar-
tiality standards. To avoid the adverse effects of partiality, the provisional
director should be someone who, at the very least, is not a shareholder or
creditor of the company, or any subsidiary of the company, and who has no
close personal, business, or financial relationship with any contending faction
within the corporation.'79 This standard of impartiality is broader than that
contained in statutes prohibiting relations "within the third-degree" to a
director or to the judge making the appointment. The broader standard
reaches relations that may not fall within the third-degree but are nonetheless
sufficiently close to suggest bias.
The qualifications of the person selected to serve as the provisional
director are also important. A provisional director who has business experi-
ence or familiarity with the industry may be better able to understand the
issues involved in the dispute. The parties are more likely to respect the
decisions of provisional directors who have a certain level of expertise and
authority. In light of their business knowledge and background, provisional
directors therefore may be better suited than the judges who appoint them to
a Judge's Impartiality 'Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 QEO. J. LEG. ETHICs 55, 92-95
(2000) (same); see also JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHIcs
§§ 4.01-4.26 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing judicial disqualification and conflicts of interests). For
a historical overview of the judicial impartiality principle, see John T. Noonan Jr., Judicial
Impartiality and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 14 NOVA L. REv. 123 (1989). One could argue that
the level of impartiality required of judges should extend to all court appointees who serve as
officers, or extensions, of the court. Thus, in the receivership context, the Supreme Court has
held that "there should be no 'friendly' receiverships, because the receiver is an officer of the
court and should be as free from 'friendliness' to a party as should the court itself." Harkin v.
Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 55 (1928); see also Dinsmore v. Barker, 212 P. 1109, 1110 (Utah 1923)
(invalidating appointment of receiver who had very small stock interest in corporation because
he could be considered "person interested in the action").
178. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995) (noting
that success of mediation depends largely upon mediator neutrality); Reuben, supra note 116,
at 1091 (noting that impartiality is indispensable quality in mediators and arbitrators). Impar-
tiality is particularly important in dispute resolution efforts involving family members and
business dissolutions in which emotions can run high. See COULSON, supra note 71, at 25-26
(discussing emotional stresses that block communication in family mediations); Freund, supra
note 71, at 484 (referring to mediation of business dissolutions as "often highly emotional
[situations], sometimes containing a degree of bitterness akin to that in a failed marriage").
179. Maine incorporates the final component of this proposed standard in its statute
providing for the appointment of an "additional director" in lieu of dissolution. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434(2)(E) (2002).
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produce informed and reasoned resolutions of corporate disputes.' In some
cases, a person may need certain specialized credentials to serve as a provi-
sional director of a particular type of corporation.""' Ideally, the appointed
person would also possess strong mediation or negotiation skills to guide the
parties toward an acceptable resolution. Although there arguably may be some
trade-offs between impartiality and expertise, it is entirely feasible for courts
to appoint provisional directors who are both impartial and sufficiently knowl-
edgeable of business affairs."8 2
Most state statutes fail to include any reference to the qualifications of
provisional directors. Some statutes provide that the court itself may simply
determine the qualifications, if any, that are needed for the appointment.8 3
Ohio appears to be the only state that affirmatively requires provisional
directors to be persons who are "generally conversant with corporate
180. Judges themselves may not have the "technical or business expertise" or the time to
develop such knowledge to "understand, factually, the particular subject matter underlying the
dispute before them." George W. Coombe, Jr., Anatomy of a Business Dispute: Successful
ADR Analysis by the Office of General Counsel, ARB. J., Sept. 1990, at 3, 11.
181. E.g., Marik v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). In Marik, a
provisional director who was a retired judge was appointed to a medical corporation that was
owned and managed equally by two shareholders who were both licensed doctors and who were
deadlocked on several business issues. Id. at 752. The state professions code required all
shareholders, directors, and officers of medical corporations to be licensed doctors. Id. at 753.
The court found that because provisional directors must have the same rights and powers as
other directors to perform their functions effectively, they must also be subject to the same
requirements and restrictions as other directors. Id. at 754. Therefore, the court held that it was
improper to appoint a provisional director who was not a doctor. Id.
182. Judge Richard Posner has discussed the exchange between impartiality and expertise
in the context of voluntary arbitration. Merit Insur. Co. v. Leatherby Insur. Co., 714 F.2d 673,
679 (7th Cir. 1983). One could argue that "impartiality is prized above expertise" in the judicial
system because "[c]ourts are coercive, not voluntary, agencies." Id. The arbitration process,
however, is voluntary, and parties choose and prefer expert decisionmaking that may mean a
loss of strict impartiality. Id. In the provisional director situation, the ultimate choice may
depend on contrasting visions of the role of the provisional director. If the provisional director
is viewed more as a contributing director, then the preference may be to find someone with the
business expertise to make sound management decisions. If the provisional director is per-
ceived as a judicial substitute, however, then someone who is experienced in judicial
decisionmaking, such as a retired judge, would be preferred. Cf Field, supra note 153, at 999
(presenting alternatives for selection of arbitrators who have either judicial skills or industry
expertise). Although these comparisons represent two extremes, parties probably will value
both impartiality and expertise, and these two values are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
183. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(c) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(c) (2000); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(c) (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(1) (West 2001); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7213(c) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. 78A. I 50(3Xa) (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2334(c) (West 1995); TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 12.53(BXI) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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affairs." '84 Although moving in the right direction, this approach may go too
far in restricting the pool of individuals who can serve as provisional directors.
A better solution is for provisional director statutes to indicate a preference for
the appointment of individuals with business experience, but not require these
qualifications if the parties agree to accept the appointment of someone who
may, for example, have specialized negotiating or mediating skills, rather than
expertise in business.8 5 Ultimately, the statute should affirmatively indicate
that the provisional director be someone who is both qualified and impartial.
3. Grounds and Standing
Even though statutes differ in defining the type of deadlock that provides
grounds for appointing a provisional director, most statutes typically require
a showing of either shareholder or director deadlock that impairs or threatens
the business of the corporation. For example, some states allow for the ap-
pointment of a provisional director if "the directors or those in control of the
corporation are deadlocked" and as a result "the corporation is suffering or will
suffer irreparable injury" or, alternatively, the corporation's business "can no
longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally because of
the deadlock."'86 Other states, such as California and Alaska, provide more
specifically that deadlock exists when the corporation has "an even number of
directors who are equally divided" and shareholders are so divided that "they
cannot elect a board consisting of an uneven number." 87 While some provi-
sional director statutes stand alone,'88 many states indirectly tie their provi-
184. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.911(C) (West 1993).
185. By the same token, parties may be better able than the court to determine what level
and type of business expertise they would prefer in the provisional director.
186. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-9 40(aX2) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.850(1)(2) (West
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(1)(b) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(a)(2) (Law.
Co-op. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(lXb) (West 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-
140(a)(ii) (Michie 2001); see also MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 40(a)(2) (mirroring state
statutory language). Other state statutes use similar language to describe the grounds for relief.
ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(a) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(a) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 29-101.167(a) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(a) (West 1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
78A. 150(1) (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(a) (West 1995); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 12.53(A) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
187. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(2) (Michie 2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(bX2)
(West 1990); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(1) (West 2001) (using similar language). The
definition of deadlock in the Alaska and California codes is found in the involuntary dissolution
provision. The codes of these states permit the appointment of provisional directors if the
deadlock grounds are met under the involuntary dissolution provisions. ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.640(a) (Michie 2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1802 (West 1990).
188. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323 (West 2001); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.911
(West 1993); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.53 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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sional director statutes to custodian provisions"' or to the state's broader
statutory involuntary dissolution scheme. 9 ' As a result, the grounds for the
custodian remedy and for involuntary dissolution also serve as grounds for the
provisional director remedy.'
Statutory language that limits relief to circumstances involving "irrepara-
ble injury" to the corporation focuses too narrowly on the effect of the dead-
lock on the business, rather than the effect it has on the shareholders and their
investment positions. 92 Injury to a shareholder or group of shareholders does
not always and necessarily translate into immediate injury to the corporation.
Therefore, the addition of the alternative phrase, "the business and affairs of
the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the sharehold-
ers generally because of the deadlock," expands the reach of the deadlock
provisions and the remedies available under the statutes.'93 Statutes that define
deadlock in terms of a divided board consisting of an "even number of direc-
tors" seem too narrowly focused as well. Deadlock can occur in a number of
ways, including circumstances in which the number of directors is odd.
Supermajority voting rights or veto powers provide opportunities for deadlock
just as easily as the existence of even numbers of directors or shareholders.
States that restrict the grounds for the provisional director remedy to deadlock
on even-numbered boards fail to take these considerations into account. 194 The
189. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-309(b) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352(b) (2001);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.166(c) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7212(b) (West 1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. 78A.140(2) (Michie 1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2333(b) (West 1995).
190. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.1430,607.1434-35 (West 2001); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/12.55-56 (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, §§ 1430, 1434 (West
2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 2001).
191. Statutes authorizing involuntary dissolution and custodianships provide additional
grounds for relief, including the waste or misapplication of corporate assets and the illegal,
fraudulent, or oppressive conduct of directors. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1430(2)(B), (D)
(1994); 805 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/12.55(a)(2), (3) (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13-C, § 1430(2)(B), (E) (West 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.494(2)(b), (d) (West 2001);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.1430(2)(b), (d) (West 2002); MBCA, supra note 52, § 14.30(2)(ii), (iv)
(1999). This Article does not attempt to review the various grounds for involuntary dissolution
or custodianships, but rather focuses more directly on the deadlock ground as it relates to the
provisional director remedy alone. For detailed discussions of the grounds for dissolution, see
2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 11, §§ 9.25-9.28; Haynsworth, supra note 51, at 31-40.
192. See Haynsworth, supra note 51, at 34 (arguing that, for economic and policy reasons,
there is little sense in "[d]enying any relief unless the corporation is on the brink of insol-
vency").
193. See In re Jamison Steel Corp., 322 P.2d 246, 251 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (finding
that this language is broad enough to establish grounds for provisional director remedy when
corporation is unable to change existing policies due to perpetuation of incumbents in office).
194. In contrast, states such as Illinois recognize that deadlock can occur in varied
circumstances and specifically provide for relief when "directors are deadlocked, whether
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better approach is to accommodate the realities of the dynamics that produce
deadlock and to give parties broader access to the provisional director remedy.
The standing requirements for requesting the provisional director remedy
vary dramatically from state to state. In many states, a petition must be filed
by at least (1) one-half the directors, (2) one-third of the shareholders who are
entitled to elect directors, or (3) two-thirds of the shareholders of any class of
stock if more than one class of stock is entitled to elect directors.1 9S In one
state, at least one-fourth of the directors or one-fifth of the shareholders may
file for the appointment of a provisional director, but only if the articles of
incorporation "expressly provide for such appointment."' 96 In states that tie
the provisional director remedy to the custodian statute or involuntary dissolu-
tion statute, any complaining shareholder may petition the court for a custo-
dian or diss6lution 97 States that follow the MBCA-CC approach permit any
shareholder to file for relief so long as the shareholder has exhausted all
nonjudicial remedies contained in the shareholder agreement.' In contrast,
several states provide for the appointment of a provisional director even if the
articles of incorporation, the bylaws, or shareholders' agreements contain
contrary provisions. 99
because of even division in the number of directors or because of greater than majority voting
requirements." 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(a)(1) (West Supp. 2002). The legislative
comments in the New Jersey statute similarly recognize the potential for deadlock without an
even-numbered board. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7, Commissioner's Comment-1968
(1969) (rejecting "jurisdictional prerequisite that there be an even number of directors" because
"[t]here may be as complete a deadlock with an odd number of directors as there is with an even
number, and the consequences of a deadlock among an odd number may be as serious as those
which result from a deadlock among an even number").
195. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(b) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(b) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(b) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(b) (West 1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. 78A.150(2) (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(b)(1) (West 1995).
196. OHuo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.911(A) (West 1993).
197. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.1430, 607.1434-35
(West 2001); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(a), (b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(12) (West Supp. 2002);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1), (2) (West Supp. 2002). Therefore, even if the standing
requirements are not met under the state's provisional director statute, the court may nonetheless
appoint a provisional director so long as the standing requirements for a custodian or involun-
tary dissolution are met.
198. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-940(c) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.850(3) (West 2001);
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(3) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833(4Xb) (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-17-140(c) (Michie
2001).
199. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(a) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(a) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(a) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(a) (West 1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. 78A.150(1) (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(a) (West 1995).
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The various standing percentage requirements under the provisional
director statutes seem to limit artificially the circumstances in which the
remedy may be pursued. The fact that the percentage levels differ so widely
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction reflects confusion over what levels are
appropriate and, more fundamentally, whether such requirements are even
necessary. Presumably the rationale for these thresholds is to deter meritless
suits brought by shareholders and directors who do not have sufficient voting
power to legitimize their claims.2' However, no evidence exists that the
provisional director remedy is more likely to produce frivolous suits than any
other remedy for corporate deadlock. Many statutes allow for the appoint-
ment of a custodian or the involuntary dissolution of the corporation, which
are much more extreme remedies, upon the application of a single shareholder
on grounds that are similar to those required for the provisional director
remedy.2"' The standing requirements for the provisional director remedy
appear arbitrary when viewed in light of the absence of such requirements for
other forms of relief.
Provisional director statutes should permit petitions to be brought by any
shareholder or director when deadlock occurs. The fact that the petitioner
must still meet the threshold of establishing deadlock that threatens to impair
the business or renders the directors incapable of effecting action is sufficient
to filter out weak claims. To the extent that fears of frivolous suits remain,
legislatures may insert an attorneys' fees provision into the statute to discour-
age such suits. The provision would allow the court, if it finds that a party
acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or in bad faith by bringing the proceeding, to
award other parties the reasonable fees and expenses they incurred in the
proceeding."
200. Similar fears have been the basis for the adoption of "security for expense" statutes
in shareholder derivative suits. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986). Under
these statutes, plaintiffs who hold less than a minimum percentage of shares must post security
for the payment of the defendant's expenses if the defendant prevails in the suit. See HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 27, § 372 (discussing security for expense statutes).
201. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-309, 10-2B-14.30 (1999); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(aX2),
(b) (West 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-47-1(2) (Michie 1991); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490.1430(2) (West 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A: 14.30(b) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-14-30(2) (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661(2) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301(2)
(2002); VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-747(A)(1) (Michie 1999).
202. As a procedural matter, statutes could require courts to hold hearings before appoint-
ing provisional directors and to give notice of the hearings to shareholders and directors. Such
notice would be similar to that required in proceedings for the appointment of custodians and
receivers. See MBCA, supra note 52, § 14.32(a) (discussing notice and hearing prior to
appointment). Ohio appears to be the only state that currently requires notice of a hearing for
the appointment of a provisional director. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.911 (A) (West 1993).
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Tensions between contrasting policy interests exist in those statutes that
authorize the appointment of provisional directors "notwithstanding any
contrary provision" in the articles, bylaws, or shareholder agreements." 3 If
shareholders have bargained for other forms of dispute resolution in these
primary documents or if they have expressly agreed not to have a provisional
director in cases of deadlock, then courts arguably intrude on shareholder
autonomy rights when they appoint provisional directors in contravention of
these agreements. At the same time, however, judicial oversight and interven-
tion is helpful when private ordering is inadequate to protect shareholder
interests. As discussed previously, shareholders cannot always bargain ex
ante for the appropriate protections in articles and agreements.2"4 States with
provisional director statutes that permit courts to override contrary provisions
in primary incorporation documents have apparently made the policy choice
that public intervention is necessary to prevent the adverse effects of dead-
lock. In contrast, statutes that defer to the wishes of shareholders as expressed
in their agreements have chosen to give predominance to shareholder auton-
omy concerns. Although the problem is not easy to resolve, the appropriate
solution lies in upholding the rights of shareholders to strike their own bar-
gains unless and until it is shown that these bargains do not reflect the parties'
true intentions. Courts should intervene to alleviate the problems associated
with deadlock when shareholders can show either that they have exhausted
their own previously bargained-for remedies or that their ex ante bargains
were clearly inadequate to provide for their current circumstances." 5 Al-
though this approach is not without its costs, it attempts to strike a balance
between competing public and private policy interests to provide parties with
both freedom and sufficient protection.
203. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(a) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(a) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(a) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(a) (West 1995); NEV. REv.
STAT. 78A.150(1) (2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(a) (West 1995).
204. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of private
ordering).
205. At the very least, the terms of any shareholder agreement should be upheld only if
they were knowingly accepted. Cf 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 36, § 7:24 (suggesting
that courts should not allow a shareholders' agreement to override shareholders' statutory rights
to seek remedies for majority shareholder misconduct, "unless the agreement contains a specific
provision on this point which the shareholders have knowingly accepted"). Courts should
consider the fact that the terms of the agreement may have been formed when relations were
harmonious and intended to govern circumstances that differ from the current situation. Id. The
MBCA suggests a similar approach in determining the fair price of shares in buy-out situations.
The Official Comment to § 14.34 recommends that courts look to the terms of shareholder
agreements to determine the fair value of shares, "unless the court decides it would be unjust
or inequitable to do so in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case." MBCA,
supra note 52, § 14.34, Official Cmt. 4(b).
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4. Removal and Compensation
Statutes generally provide that provisional directors serve until removed
by the court or by a majority of the shareholders entitled to elect directors."
A few states also allow the appointment to continue until the deadlock on the
board or among shareholders is broken.2 °7 Some states place specific time
limits on the tenure of provisional directors-for example, two or three
years.2"8 New Jersey is unique in that it prohibits the removal of the provi-
sional director by the shareholders if the court otherwise orders the continu-
ance of the appointment. 9 States that follow the MBCA-CC make no men-
tion at all of the conditions necessary for removing the provisional director.
Whether the power to remove the provisional director should rest in the
hands of the parties or in the discretion of the court is a question that again
raises competing policy concerns. The easy case is when all parties agree that
the deadlock has been broken and that the services of the provisional director
are no longer needed. No one would object to the removal of the provisional
director at that point. However, more complex problems occur when deadlock
persists and the parties disagree on whether the provisional director should
continue in office. On the one hand, the shareholders by majority vote should
have the right to remove the provisional director if they decide that they do
not want to have a third party making decisions for them, even if the deadlock
continues to exist. The court should not force upon the parties a remedy that
in many respects requires their cooperation in order to produce the most
effective and acceptable solution for all concerned. On the other hand, the
court must have a certain level of authority and discretion to control the terms
and tenure of its own appointee and to prevent bad faith attempts to frustrate
the court's authority. This policy concern underlies the New Jersey provision
that allows the parties to remove the provisional director "unless otherwise
206. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(c) (1999); CAL. CORP. CODE § 308(c) (West Supp. 2001);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(c) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-101.167(c) (2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7213(c) (West 1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2334(d) (West 1995); TEx. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.53(B)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
207. ALAsKA STAT. § 10.06.640(b) (Michie 2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 308(c) (West Supp.
2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(2) (West 2001). The Ohio statute requires the court to order
the removal of the provisional director when the court finds that "irreconcilable differences no
longer exist." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.911(B) (West 1993).
208. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.323(2) (West Supp. 2001) (limiting term of provisional
director to three years if deadlock is not broken). Maine authorizes the appointment of an
"additional director" for a period not to exceed two years. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C,
§ 1434(2)(E) (2002).
209. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(3) (West Supp. 2002) (providing for removal "by order
of the court or, unless otherwise ordered by the court, by a vote . .. of a majority of the votes
entitled to be cast by the holders of shares") (emphasis added).
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ordered by the court.1210 The statute's legislative history indicates that the
legislature "felt it necessary to empower the court to prohibit removal by the
shareholders since such power might be exercised by a majority in bad faith
to frustrate the power of the court to determine all underlying facts.
211
Although the court's effective oversight is an important concern, greater
shareholder control should be the primary consideration. Shareholders may
be deadlocked on certain management issues and yet be in agreement that they
no longer wish to have a court-appointed stranger casting tie-breaking votes
for them. The shareholders might decide to try to resolve the dispute in an
alternative forum. If a majority of the shareholders votes to remove the
provisional director, the court should not frustrate their right to choose their
own path. More importantly, if the reason that the shareholders wish to
dismiss the provisional director is because the relationship between the parties
is extremely hostile and the shareholders' orientation toward the provisional
director is equally hostile, then the provisional director remedy simply is no
longer appropriate. The remedy will most likely be ineffective to solve the
severe dissension in the long run anyway, and other more drastic remedies
may be needed. The provisional director remedy is designed to be a first step
in an attempt to resolve corporate deadlock, and the success of the remedy,
much like mediation-arbitration, depends in large part on the voluntary
cooperation of the parties. When the parties cannot even find sufficient
common ground to continue with the provisional director approach, courts
should not compel the parties to engage in a process that they do not accept.
Therefore, provisional director statutes should clarify that provisional direc-
tors may be removed when the deadlock is broken, when the majority of the
shareholders vote to remove, or when the court itself recognizes the futility of
the remedy and orders the removal of its appointee.212 The statutes should not
authorize courts to prevent the removal of provisional directors if the share-
holders have expressly indicated their preference for removal.
Finally, provisional director statutes should authorize the reasonable
compensation of provisional directors for their services. Although some state
statutes and the MBCA-CC fail to provide specifically for provisional direc-
tors' compensation, there is consensus among other states that an agreement
between the provisional director and the corporation should determine com-
pensation, with the approval of the court.213 The court may fix the compensa-
210. Id.
211. Id. Commissioner's Comment-1972 Amendments. Some commentators similarly
fear that majority shareholders who can remove the director immediately after the appointment
may frustrate the purposes of the provisional director remedy. E.g., Wall, supra note 17, at 640.
212. See infra Part VA (proposing model statute).
213. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-310(c) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353(c) (2001); D.C.
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tion in the absence of such an agreement. Provisional directors also deserve
reimbursement or the direct payment of any reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of the appointment."1 4 These amounts should be paid
by the corporation."'
V Proposed Model Provisional Director Statute
A. Proposed Text and Recommendations
The foregoing critical analysis of the various state provisional director
statutes suggests a need for a model statute that balances the important policy
principles underlying the remedy. This subpart sets forth a proposed model
statute that incorporates the conclusions drawn in the preceding discussion
with respect to each aspect of the provisional director remedy. This Article
recommends that the model statute be considered for adoption in all states'
general corporations codes. The text of the proposed statute is as follows:
Model Provisional Director Statute
§ 000 - Appointment of Provisional Director for Deadlock
(A) Grounds, Standing, and Exhaustion of Nonjudicial Reme-
dies. If the directors or those in control of the corporation are
deadlocked in the management of the corporation's affairs, the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and the business and
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advan-
tage of the shareholders generally or there is danger that the corpora-
tion's property and business will be impaired or lost because of the
deadlock, the court may appoint a provisional director upon the
petition of any complaining shareholder or director. If the petitioner
has agreed in writing to pursue a nonjudicial remedy to resolve
disputed matters, the petitioner may not commence a proceeding
under this section with respect to the matter unless (i) the
nonjudicial remedy has been exhausted or (ii) the petitioner estab-
CODEANN. § 29-101.167(c) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7213(c) (West 1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. 78A.150(4) (2001); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 1701.911(C) (West 1994); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2334(e) (West 1995); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.53(B)(4) (Vernon Supp.
2001).
214. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1435(3) (West 2001); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(g)
(West Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(7) (West Supp. 2002).
215. See Coles v. Taliaferro, 840 P.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Kan. 1992) (holding that provi-
sional director's fees must be paid out of corporation's assets).
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lishes that the terms of the agreement are patently unfair or inade-
quate in light of current circumstances.
(B) Impartiality and Qualifications. The provisional director
shall be an impartial person who is neither a shareholder, creditor,
or debtor of the corporation or of any subsidiary or affiliate of the
corporation and who has no close personal, business, or financial
relationship with the members of any contending faction within the
corporation. Persons who have a proven business background or
who are conversant with corporate affairs shall be strongly pre-
ferred.
(C) Rights, Powers, and Duties. The provisional director shall
have the right to notice of meetings of directors and the power to
vote at such meetings on all matters upon which the parties are
deadlocked, unless the parties request and the court prescribes a
limited set of matters upon which the provisional director may vote.
The duty of the provisional director is to cast votes in the best
interest of the corporation with the purpose of breaking the deadlock
upon such disputed matters. Upon the request of the court, the
provisional director shall report to the court, periodically and in the
presence of the parties, concerning the status of the deadlock and
the corporation's business and shall submit recommendations to the
court as to the appropriate disposition of the matter.
(D) Removal and Compensation. The provisional director shall
serve until such time as the deadlock is broken or the provisional
director is removed by order of the court or by a vote of the holders
of a majority of the shares having voting power. The provisional
director shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for services
rendered, such compensation to be determined by agreement be-
tween the provisional director and the corporation with the approval
of the court. The court may fix the compensation of the provisional
director in the absence of agreement or in the event of disagreement
between the corporation and the provisional director. All amounts
shall be paid by the corporation. The corporation shall also reim-
burse or make direct payments to the provisional director for rea-
sonable costs and expenses incurred during the term of the provi-
sional director's appointment.
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(E) Immunity. The provisional director shall be immune from
civil liability for any acts or omissions within the scope of the
performance of the provisional director's powers and duties, so long
as the provisional director acted in good faith, without malice, and
not for improper personal enrichment.
(F) Attorneys' Fees. If the court finds that the petitioner acted
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or in bad faith in initiating a proceeding
under this provision, the court may award one or more other parties
their reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in the
proceeding.
B. Discussion
Section (A) of the proposed statute sets forth the grounds and the standing
requirements for the appointment of a provisional director. The description of
deadlock includes the broader grounds that the business of the corporation
"can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally."216
The statute omits any reference to deadlock on a board consisting of an "even
number of directors" because, as discussed previously, deadlock can easily
occur on boards consisting of odd numbers of directors as well.217 The statute
grants standing to any complaining shareholder or director and eliminates the
artificial ownership percentage requirements for standing that are contained
in most provisional director statutes. 18 To the extent that the broader standing
provision induces fears of frivolous petitions, Section (F) discourages such
petitions by allowing the court to award attorneys' fees and costs if it finds that
the petitioner has brought the action in bad faith.2 19 Finally, Section (A)
attempts to strike the appropriate balance between the interests of private
ordering and judicial oversight by requiring shareholders first to exhaust any
remedies contained in shareholder agreements, unless such agreements are
inadequate to provide the relief necessary to protect shareholder interests.22°
Section (A) does not include language permitting the provisional director
remedy only if the articles of incorporation expressly provide for it. Nor does
it authorize the provisional director remedy "notwithstanding any contrary
provisions" contained in the articles or shareholder agreements. 22' The pro-
216. MBCA-CC, supra note 16, § 40(aX2); supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
217. Supra notes 32-34, 194 and accompanying text.
218. Supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
219. Supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
220. Supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
221. Supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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posed statute rejects both extremes. Instead, the proposed statute accommo-
dates both public and private interests by allowing the appointment of provi-
sional directors so long as the appropriate grounds exist and the standing
requirements are met.
Section (B) requires the complete impartiality of the provisional director
and prohibits the appointment of anyone who has a close personal, business,
or financial relationship with the members of any contending faction within the
corporation. Because this standard is broader than the restriction on relations
"within the third-degree" contained in some states' statutes, it ensures a
greater level of impartiality.22 The model statute expresses a preference for
the appointment of individuals who have business experience and knowledge
because these qualifications are particularly helpful in the resolution of busi-
ness disputes. However, the statute does not mandate business expertise and
credentials if, for example, the parties prefer individuals who possess other
skills and qualifications, such as mediation and negotiation expertise.223 Thus,
the statute accommodates the interests and preferences of the parties in ap-
pointing a provisional director who is both completely neutral and sufficiently
qualified.
Section (C) specifies the rights, powers, and duties of the provisional
director. The proposed statute deliberately excludes language suggesting that
provisional directors have the same "rights, powers, and duties as duly elected
directors." '224 As previously discussed, provisional directors are not identical
to ordinary directors, and statutes that equate their rights and obligations are
misdirected.225 The proposed statute also declines to swing to the other ex-
treme of having the court prescribe every right, power, duty, term, and condi-
tion of the appointment. Instead, Section (C) specifies the default rule for
provisional directors' rights and responsibilities. Provisional directors have
directorial rights to notice of meetings and to vote on all deadlocked issues.
Parties may opt out of this default rule by having the court, upon the parties'
request, limit the issues upon which the provisional director can vote. In
addition, the duties of the provisional director are specifically defined in
Section (C) to include the duty to cast tie-breaking votes in the best interests
of the corporation. Because the statute excludes any reference to the same
"duties as duly elected directors," it eliminates the suggestion that provisional
directors are subject to the same fiduciary duties as ordinary directors.226
Finally, the statute requires provisional directors to report periodically to the
222. Supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
223. Supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
224. Supra note 128.
225. Supra Part IV.B.1 .a.
226. Supra Part IV.B.ILb.
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court as to the status of the matter and make recommendations as needed.
Such reporting can be particularly helpful to the court in determining the
appropriate disposition of the matter.227 All reports and recommendations
must be submitted to the court in the presence of the parties so that they will
have opportunities to respond.
Section (D) covers the removal and compensation of the provisional
director. It states that reasonable compensation is to be paid to the provisional
director for services rendered. It also provides for the removal of the provi-
sional director once the deadlock is broken, or upon order of the court or
majority vote of the shareholders."2 ' The proposed statute excludes any
arbitrary time limits for the tenure of the provisional director's appointment in
order to preserve the flexibility of the court and the parties to utilize the remedy
as they deem best.229 As with the other components of the proposed statute, the
removal provision attempts to balance competing public and private interests.
The provision allocates control between the shareholders and the court in
terminating the remedy when it has either served its purpose or otherwise
would be in the best interests of the parties.
Finally, Section (E) grants qualified judicial immunity to provisional
directors for the decisions they make within the scope of their appointment. No
state statute currently addresses the issue of immunity for the decisions and
actions of provisional directors. One court has held that provisional directors
are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from civil actions.230
Whether provisional directors are entitled to immunity is a significant issue
that merits consideration. The following subpart completes the discussion of
the proposed model statute by analyzing the propriety of extending immunity
to provisional directors.
C. Immunity
Absolute judicial immunity shields judges from civil liability for acts that
are judicial in nature and performed within the scope of judges' jurisdiction.23 '
The judicial immunity doctrine protects the independence and freedom of
227. Supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
228. Supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
229. Supra note 208 and accompanying text.
230. Latt v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
231. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judiciallmmunityfrom Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (describing doctrine of judicial immunity). The judicial immunity
doctrine has a long history in our legal system. For discussions of the historical development
ofjudicial immunity, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,529-36 (1984); OLOWOFOYEKU, supra
note 26, at 1-32; J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History ofJudiciallmmunity,
1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 881-910.
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judges to make decisions without fear of lawsuits brought by disgruntled
litigants. 232 Judicial immunity exists not only to protect judges, but also to
protect litigants and members of society at large, all of whom have an interest
in a judiciary that acts independently and impartially, uninfluenced by fear of
reprisal and harassment.233
Only judicial acts, rather than administrative acts, fall within the protec-
tion of judicial immunity. Acts are judicial in nature if they require the
exercise of some amount of discretion and are functions normally performed
by judges in their judicial capacity.) 4 Judicial immunity does not generally
cover ministerial and administrative acts, such as the hiring and firing of
employees. 5 Because the purpose of the judicial immunity doctrine is to
protect the independent decisionmaking function of the judiciary, the doctrine
reaches only those acts that require the judgment and discretion typically
exercised by judges in the adjudication of controversies. 6 Absolute immu-
232. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 177, § 14.01, at 492 ("Today it is generally recog-
nized that the most important purpose of judicial immunity is to protect judicial independ-
ence."); see also Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,435 (1993) ("The doctrine
of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and
partial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential
damages liability."); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-09 (1978) (discussing need for
judicial immunity to protect judges from complaints by losing parties). As the Supreme Court
has stated, a judge must "be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge ... would destroy that independence without which no
judiciary can be either respectable or useful." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 347
(1871).
233. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Block, supra note 231, at 922-23. But see
K-G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 How. L.J. 95,
105 (1995) (arguing that judicial immunity doctrine "has no constitutional or statutory basis"
and is "repugnant to the American ideal of equality under the law").
234. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978) (developing two-part test for
analyzing judicial acts based on nature of act itself and expectations of parties in dealing with
judges in their judicial capacity).
235. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228-30 (1988); see also Clark v. Campbell, 514 F.
Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (finding that decisions of county judge in hiring and firing
county employees do not constitute judicial acts because "[i]t is clear that these duties are purely
administrative and ministerial in scope"). Commentators agree that the difference between
judicial and nonjudicial acts is not always clear. See, e.g., Pillai, supra note 233, at 112-13
(noting that "dividing line between non-judicial official act and judicial act" can be blurry,
"ending in confusion for those who try to distinguish between them"); Joseph Romagnoli, Note,
What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
1503, 1507-09 (1985) (discussing substantive problems with trying to define judicial acts).
236. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980) (contrast-
ing judicial acts of court that arise out of controversies that must be adjudicated with legislative
acts of court when promulgating disciplinary rules); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914
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nity is very broad and covers all judicial acts, even if they were done in bad
faith, with malice, or for corrupt reasons. 237 However, judges are not exempt
from criminal liability for their criminal acts or misconduct.238
Judicial immunity has been extended to other persons who perform
"quasi-judicial" functions and who exercise authority and discretion similar
to that of judges.239 Individuals who are integrally related to the judicial
process and who serve as extensions of the court are afforded quasi-judicial
immunity to ensure the independent performance of their duties. 240 Immunity
has been granted to a host of quasi-judicial officers including, among others,
administrative law judges, prosecuting attorneys, jurors, law clerks, and
probation officers when submitting pre-sentencing reports to judges.24' In
instances in which judges delegate part of their authority to others or appoint
individuals to perform services on behalf of the court, 'judicial immunity may
(9th Cir. 1982) (noting that "adjudication of controversies between adversaries" is judicial
function giving rise to "recognition of absolute immunity for judicial officers"); Calvin T.
Wilson, Judicial Immunity-To Be or Not to Be, 25 How. L.J. 809, 814-15 (1982) (noting that
judicial acts are those that involve exercise of discretion or judgment).
237. OLOwoFoYEKu, supra note 26, at 33; Shaman, supra note 231, at 2.
238. See Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945) ("Judicial title does
not render its holder immune to crime even when committed behind the shield of judicial
office."); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 177, § 14.11, at 508 (explaining that judicial immunity
does not exempt judges from criminal liability). Moreover, judges do not possess immunity for
actions that violate ethical codes of judicial conduct. See id. § 14.01, at 494 (stating that
immunity does not ordinarily apply to disiplinary actions against judges for violations of
professional and ethical standards).
239. Shaman, supra note 231, at 6. One working definition of "quasi-judicial function"
describes it as a "function or act which involves the exercise of independent judgment and
discretion in arriving at a decision which affects individual interests and is based upon a
consideration of facts and/or law, where the deciding body or individual is not a court or judge
in the ordinary sense." OLOWOFOYEKU, supra note 26, at 82.
240. See OLOWOFOYEKU, supra note 26, at 86-91 (discussing quasi-judicial immunity).
241. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (granting immunity to administra-
tive law judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427 (1976) (granting immunity to prosecu-
tors); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979) (granting immunity to probation
officers); White v. Hegehorst, 418 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1969) (granting immunity to jurors);
Oliva v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting immunity to law clerks),
aft'd, 839 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385,
1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting immunity to bankruptcy trustees); Wiggins v. N.M. Supreme
Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Cir. 1981) (granting immunity to court clerks); Simons
v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (granting immunity to state bar examining
committees when investigating an attorney's practice); Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642, 643
(9th Cir. 1968) (granting immunity to parole board members); Schinner v. Strathmann, 711 F.
Supp. 1143, 1144 (D.D.C. 1989) (granting immunity to psychiatrist assisting court in determin-
ing person's mental competence to stand trial).
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follow the delegation or appointment." '242 Thus, court-appointed mediators
have been granted quasi-judicial immunity when performing their dispute
resolution functions.243 In one case involving the extension of immunity to a
psychologist performing mediation services in a family custody proceeding,
the court found that the mediator's function in attempting to resolve the
dispute was similar to that of a judge.244 The court reasoned that quasi-judi-
cial immunity should apply to neutral third parties who perform "dispute
resolution services which are connected to the judicial process and involve
either (1) the making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings or
recommendations to the court, or (3) the arbitration, mediation, conciliation,
evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes." 245  Although
mediators do not make binding decisions, their role has been viewed as
functionally comparable to that of judges insofar as judges actively manage
cases to assist the parties in reaching a settlement.246 This functional compara-
242. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 177, § 14.02, at 496.
243. E.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Mills v. Killebrew, 765
F.2d 69, 72 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Sargeant Farms, Inc., 224 BR. 842, 848 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1998).
244. See Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893,902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that job
of "mediators, conciliators, and evaluators involves impartiality and neutrality, as does that of
a judge, commissioner or referee; hence there should be entitlement to the same immunity given
others who function as neutrals in an attempt to resolve disputes").
245. Id. at 903.
246. See J. Sue Richardson, Mediation: The Florida Legislature Grants JudicialImmunity
to Court-Appointed Mediators, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 623,632 (1990) (stating that mediator's
role is similar to judge's role in helping parties to reach settlement); see also Cassondra E.
Joseph, The Scope ofMediator Immunity: When Mediators Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 629, 662 (1997) (remarking that, from functional standpoint, role
of mediators is similar to judge presiding at settlement conference). Many judges view
themselves as mediators to the extent that they actively attempt to move the parties toward
settlement. See Silver, supra note 68, at 72 (noting former judge's comment emphasizing
similarity between mediators and judges). Judges in some courts receive mediation training and
are encouraged to "actively and firmly (but not coercively) seek to settle every case on [their]
docket." Alschuler, supra note 116, at 1829-30. In one mediator immunity case, the court
found that the identification of factual and legal issues and the coordination of settlement efforts
are tasks involving substantial discretion and are assumed not only by judges but by case
evaluators and mediators as well. Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252. According to the Wagshal court,
"the general process of encouraging settlement is a natural, almost inevitable, concomitant of
adjudication." Id. Not all commentators agree with the result in Wagshal. Some have argued
that the court's reasoning was flawed because the rationale for judicial immunity is to preserve
the independence ofjudges' decisionmaking functions, not their settlement-inducing functions.
See Caroline Turner English, Mediator Immunity: Stretching the Doctrine ofAbsolute Quasi-
Judiciallmmunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 759,777 (1995) ("Encouraging
settlement has never been considered as a basis for judicial immunity.").
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bility has formed the basis for extending quasi-judicial immunity to those who
perform mediation services.247
Immunity also has been granted to arbitrators for actions and decisions
made in the scope of their arbitral functions.248 By making findings and
rendering decisions in an adversarial format, arbitrators function much like
judges. 49 Arbitrators evaluate arguments of parties, listen to witness testi-
mony, and exercise discretion in the same way that judges do. In order to
preserve the independence of arbitrators' judgment, arbitral immunity is
viewed as "essential to protect the [arbitrator] from undue influence and
protect the decisionmaking process from reprisals by dissatisfied litigants."2 '
Therefore, courts have widely held that arbitrators as quasi-judicial officers
are entitled to immunity shielding them from liability for their decisions. 1
In recognition of the functional comparability of mediators and arbitra-
tors with judges, many states have enacted legislation that grants quasi-
judicial immunity to mediators and arbitrators. These statutes extend two
different categories of immunity. One set of statutes explicitly provides that
mediators and arbitrators are to be treated exactly like judges in terms of the
247. The extension of immunity to mediators has met with resistance and criticism by those
who fear that it improperly denies recourse to litigants injured by incompetent mediation
services. See Linda R. Singer, Immunity Imperils the Public and Mediator Professionalism,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at C12 (arguing that granting immunity to mediators could damage
parties with legitimate claims and impede mediator professionalism). Critics argue that the
extension of judicial immunity to mediators is inappropriate because mediators do not make
binding decisions and do not need freedom from liability similar to that possessed by adjudica-
tors. Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment
for Model Legislation, 2 OHIo ST. J. oN Disp. RESOL. 47, 81-83 (1986); English, supra note
246, at 776-83. But see Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL.
85, 85-86 (1986) (discounting theories of mediator liability and arguing in favor of immunity
for mediators).
248. See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 228,
229 (1989) (discussing doctrine of arbitral immunity).
249. Id. at 234. In many respects, "an arbitrator simply is a substitute judge." Chaykin,
supra note 155, at 734. The fact that the similarities between the functions of arbitrators and
judges justify the extension of judicial immunity to arbitrators is widely accepted. See, e.g.,
Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvilz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (finding
that because there was "no reason to distinguish between a judge and an arbitrator in deciding
the issue" of immunity, "the same rule of immunity should apply to arbitrators as applies to the
judiciary, inasmuch as the same reasons of public policy are applicable").
250. Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982).
251. E.g., Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1990);
Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987); Int'l Union v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (6th Cir. 1983); Tamari v, Conrad, 552 F.2d 778,
780-81 (7th Cir. 1977); Cahn v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir.
1962); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324,326 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
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scope of their immunity from civil liability. For example, North Carolina's
statute states that "[a]rbitrators . . shall have the same immunity as judges
from civil liability for their official conduct." '252
A second category of statutes places certain caveats on the conferral of
immunity to mediators and arbitrators. These "qualified immunity" statutes
typically allow mediators and arbitrators to claim immunity from civil liability
so long as they act in good faith and without malice in the performance of
their duties.253 Oregon's mediation statute, for instance, exempts mediators
from civil liability for any acts or omissions made in the scope of their duties
unless "the act or omission was made or done in bad faith, with malicious
intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights,
safety or property of another."254
Qualified immunity statutes provide a compromise between absolute
judicial immunity on the one hand and exposure to full civil liability on the
other. Unlike absolute immunity, qualified immunity does not extend so far
as to cover bad faith, malicious, or corrupt actions.255 Mediators and arbitra-
tors who deliberately and maliciously abuse their positions of power are liable
for their misconduct. All other good faith decisions and actions are fully
protected by immunity. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity serves to
balance competing policy interests, including "the need to protect officials
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37.1(e) (2001); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(f)
(West Supp. 2002) ("[A]n arbitrator or mediator . . . shall have the same immunity which
attaches in judicial proceedings."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.107 (West 1998) ("An arbitrator...
or a mediator... shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a
judge."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5073(1) (Supp. 2002) ("An arbitrator appointed under
this chapter is immune from liability in regard to the arbitration proceeding to the same extent
as the circuit judge who has jurisdiction of the action that is submitted to arbitration.").
253. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(E) (West 1993) (providing no mediator
civil liability unless action was result of "gross negligence with malicious purpose" or "in a
manner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of any party to the media-
tion"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-30-23 (2000) (providing no arbitrator civil liability if arbitrator
acted "in good faith, without malice, and not for improper personal enrichment"); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.23 (Michie Supp. 2002) (providing no mediator civil liability unless mediator
acted in "bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard
of the rights, safety or property of another").
254. OR. REV. STAT. § 36.210(1) (2001).
255. Courts have developed the doctrine of qualified immunity and applied it to govern-
ment officials to shield them from suits for damages. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
806-07 (1982) (recognizing common law doctrine of immunity for public officers to protect
them from "undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
liability"). Under the qualified immunity standard, officials performing discretionary functions
are generally protected from civil liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818.
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from harassing and often frivolous lawsuits" and "the need to provide relief
to those subjected to an abuse of office.t
256
In the context of the provisional director remedy, no state statutes cur-
rently provide for the immunity of provisional directors from civil liability.
However, the foregoing discussion reveals that the extension of immunity to
provisional directors may be appropriate. The provisional director in many
respects serves as a quasi-judicial officer appointed by the court to resolve
corporate deadlock. In casting tie-breaking votes in favor of one contending
faction, a provisional director acts much like a judge who considers the
arguments of the parties and exercises discretion in rendering a decision. The
same policy rationales for protecting the independent decisionmaking func-
tions of the judiciary apply to provisional directors who must be free to make
difficult decisions without fear of retaliation by losing factions. As court-
appointees, provisional directors arguably act as extensions of the court by
performing services on behalf of the court. For example, provisional directors
may provide assistance to the court by reporting periodically on the status of
the matter and providing recommendations to the court if necessary as to the
disposition of the action. There is a sense in which provisional directors
derive their decisionmaking authority from the judge who appoints them, and
they function in coordination with the judge. 58
256. Austin Mun. See., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sees. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 686 (5th
Cir. 1985).
257. The model provisional director statute proposed in this Article provides for such
reporting and submission of recommendations. Supra text accompanying note 227.
258. Indeed, the one appellate court that appears to have dealt directly with the issue held
that provisional directors are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they serve as
delegated judges and their "duties are as judicial in all respects . . . as if they had been per-
formed by the judge." Latt v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
In Lati, a provisional director, who himself was a retired judge, was sued by a shareholder who
was ousted from his office in the corporation by a vote of the provisional director and the other
shareholder faction. Id. at 381-82. After discussing the principle and purpose of judicial
immunity, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's extension of immunity to the provisional
director on the grounds that the provisional director statute "literally and inherently create[d]
a judicial position to be filled by a delegate of a superior court judge." Id. at 384. The court
found that the term "provisional director" could just as easily be replaced with the terms
"delegated judge," "commissioner," or "court's representative." Id. The court viewed the
qualifications for the provisional director position as being substantially similar to those
required for the exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Id. Although the appointed
provisional director was a retired judge, the trial court explicitly stated that that fact was
irrelevant. Id. at 382. The trial court expressed a concern that the denial of immunity would
have a chilling effect on the ability of parties to find qualified, impartial individuals who would
be willing to serve as provisional directors. Id. The court viewed the provisional director
remedy as an efficient procedure that saves courts' time by permitting the delegation of judicial
authority that courts would otherwise have to assume. Id. at 384. As a result, the court felt it
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From a dispute resolution standpoint, provisional directors function much
like mediators and arbitrators. As discussed previously, a provisional director
may be viewed in certain respects as a mediator-arbitrator who first attempts
to help parties reach agreement, but if that fails, then renders a tie-breaking
vote in favor of one side.259 Courts and state legislatures have extended both
absolute and qualified quasi-judicial immunity to mediators and arbitrators
because their services have been held to be functionally comparable to those
ofjudges. Because provisional directors share many of these same functions,
the extension of immunity to the actions and decisions of provisional directors
seems appropriate as well.2"°
In fact, provisional directors' functional comparability to judges, media-
tors, and arbitrators suggests that the conferral of absolute immunity would not
necessarily be improper. Yet, parties may fear that absolute immunity pro-
vides too broad a shield against liability. Provisional directors who are not
held to the same high standards of fiduciaries may be tempted to make deci-
sions in bad faith or for corrupt reasons. If absolute immunity applies,-parties
may have no recourse in situations in which provisional directors have en-
gaged in misconduct or intentionally abused the authority of their position for
their own personal gain. In such instances, absolute immunity may produce a
would be "patently unfair to burden a court's delegate (a provisional director) with civil liability
for judicial acts performed for which a judge exercising the same functions could not be civilly
liable." Id.
259. See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing mediation-arbitration).
260. One might argue that the extension of immunity is unnecessary because provisional
directors and parties may simply define for themselves the scope of the provisional director's
liabilities, and they may contract for indemnification or insurance to protect provisional
directors to the extent desired. In fact, in the mediation context, to the extent that immunity
does not apply, attempts have been made to use such private arrangements to avoid mediator
liability. Some mediators have requested that their clients enter into agreements that contain
general exculpatory clauses. Chaykin, supra note 247, at 47 n.2. The effectiveness and
propriety of such exculpatory agreements may be questionable. See id. (observing that law
frowns upon exculpatory clauses, construes them narrowly, and often finds them unenforce-
able); see also Joseph, supra note 246, at 664 (noting possibility of using insurance and
indemnification to protect mediators from liability). The difficulty with attempting to contract
for the appropriate protections is that the parties and provisional directors may not be able to
come to an agreement that is mutually satisfactory. In Marciano v. Nakash, 1986 W 4002
(Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1986), for example, a court-appointed custodian was unable to reach an
agreement with the parties as to the appropriate level of indemnities that were to be afforded to
the custodian. Id. at * 1-*2. In particular, one of the contending factions within the corporation
took issue with several of the custodian's decisions and thereafter refused to provide personal
indemnities and guarantees. Id. at *1. The custodian therefore was "unwilling to serve as
custodian without reasonable assurances that he [would] not be drawn into extensive and costly
litigation as the result of his decisions which, perforce, [would] be opposed by one side or the
other." Id. at *2. Without judicial immunity, qualified individuals may be reluctant to serve as
custodians and provisional directors.
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result that seems unnecessarily harsh. At the same time, however, provisional
directors must be free to work with the parties and make tie-breaking decisions
without being constantly fearful that those decisions will result in lawsuits by
angry losing factions. Provisional directors who are honest, sincere, and do
their best to make well-reasoned decisions should be protected from liability
when parties do not like the outcome. Imposing full liability on provisional
directors may create disincentives for qualified, impartial persons to serve in
261this capacity.
As discussed above, qualified immunity balances these competing policy
interests by shielding only those actions that are made in good faith and
without malice. This approach upholds the interests of parties in preventing
misconduct by provisional directors while simultaneously protecting provi-
sional directors from meritless lawsuits. The model provisional director
statute proposed in this Article sets forth such a qualified immunity standard.
It provides that provisional directors are immune from civil liability for any
acts performed within the scope of their functions, so long as provisional
directors act in good faith, without malice, and not for improper personal
enrichment.262 Although absolute immunity would arguably be justified in
light of the quasi-judicial functions of the provisional director, states may
instead wish to adopt the proposed qualified immunity standard due to the
countervailing policy principles involved.
Like the other provisions in the proposed provisional director statute, the
immunity clause is intended to reflect a balancing of interests. The statute
should be considered as a whole. It attempts to provide an integrated view of
the provisional director remedy. By incorporating and accommodating the
fundamental policy principles that underlie the remedy, the proposed statute
may go further than current provisional director statutes in promoting the goals
and effectiveness of the remedy.
Vi. Conclusion
The provisional director remedy is a unique method of resolving corpo-
rate deadlock. Provisional directors share many of the same characteristics as
custodians, arbitrators, and mediators, yet provisional directors have a unique
261. See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that individuals
"cannot be expected to volunteer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in the struggle
between the litigants and saddled with the burdens of defending a lawsuit"); Latt v. Superior
Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that "absent a rule of immunity,
there would be a chilling effect upon the ability of litigants in a case such as this to obtain
services of a qualified, impartial arbiter"); see also Chaykin, supra note 247, at 51 (noting that
"the fear of civil liability can have a demoralizing impact").
262. See supra Part VA (proposing model statutory provision that incorporates qualified
immunity for provisional directors).
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function as voting members of the board. The appointment by the court of
these temporary tie-breakers raises concerns about the appropriate balance
among shareholder autonomy interests, court authority and involvement, and
public and private ordering regimes. Different courts and state provisional
director statutes vary considerably in their approach to the remedy, reflecting
the difficulty of determining the exact nature, role, and purpose of the provi-
sional director position. Efforts to fit provisional directors into neatly catego-
rized boxes of "officers of the court" or "ordinary directors" for all purposes
often produce unintended and undesirable results. The analysis presented in
this Article attempts to construct a more comprehensive, integrated picture of
the provisional director remedy and formulates a model that balances compet-
ing interests.
The appointment of a provisional director is not the answer for all forms
of deadlock within corporations. However, it can be an important and effec-
tive first step in resolving certain impasses in corporate enterprises. Perhaps
courts should be more willing to grant the provisional director remedy as a first
line of attack in corporate deadlock cases, even in situations in which the
differences seem irreconcilable upon first glance. The provisional director's
presence may ultimately go a long way toward breaking the deadlock among
the parties and moving the corporation forward. States without provisional
director legislation should consider adopting such legislation to give corporate
shareholders and directors more options for remedying deadlock. The model
statute proposed in this Article provides states and courts with a framework for
applying the provisional director remedy in a way that upholds the interests of
shareholders and preserves the ongoing nature of the business.
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